CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

From analysis to reform 207
corrupt influence and violence. In the Philippines extensive colonization
of the state, economy, and politics by a small number of powerful families
has distorted development and, at times, inhibited democratization.
Mexico has engaged in extensive institution-building, and well-run competitive
elections are a welcome development, but those changes together
with a generation of economic liberalization have fragmented the country’s
single strongest institution – the PRI – and shifted corruption in
some dangerous directions. Oligarch and Clan corruption is not only
rapacious and highly visible; it is also unpredictable, threatening to
democracy advocates and investors, and a powerful source of injustice.
The existence of oligarchs is not surprising in rapidly changing societies.
Newly open economies and political processes, particularly where
institutions are weak, confer advantages upon the few who are quick
enough, and who possess the connections and backing, to take advantage
of new opportunities (Khan, 2002). But pervasive insecurity means that
violence will be all too tempting, while building a secure political or economic
foundation by more conventional means can be a risky process of
mobilizing the weak against the strong. Advocates of broader interests in
society, and in particular those opposed to corruption, will find it difficult to
locate the real processes of influence and even harder to change them.
Influence Market and Elite Cartel countries’ corruption problems are
worth serious concern; but both have bases for governing – relatively
strong and autonomous state institutions in the first group and in the
second, the elite political settlement underwritten by Elite Cartel corruption
itself. Oligarch and Clan societies, however, lack such foundations,
and they depart from our developmental ideal in several ways. State,
political, and social institutions are very weak and ineffective, and are
easily manipulated by oligarchs. Economic and political participation,
while burgeoning, is risky, disorderly, strongly influenced by oligarchs,
and (even more than in Elite Cartel cases) not confined to official arenas.
Corrupt deals proliferate but lack guarantors, making them disruptive,
unpredictable, and prone to violence.
Rapid liberalization of economies and politics in the absence of essential
institutional foundations has fueled corruption in Oligarch and Clan
directions; further liberalization in the name of reform may well make
things worse, erasing the feeble boundaries between wealth and power,
state and society, and adding to insecurity at all levels of society.
Institution-building and improvements to public management are urgent
needs but lack political backing. Nascent civil societies in these countries
are divided, intimidated, and impoverished; parties and political followings
are weak, personalized, and too narrow and numerous to produce
anything like broad-based mandates. We may call for political will, but