CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

188 Syndromes of Corruption
The syndromes and cases
The core argument is for the existence of four qualitatively different major
syndromes of corruption. There is no magic in the number four: many
more combinations of participation and institutions can be imagined, and
cluster analysis can isolate as many groups as we have cases. Statistical
indicators, however, do point to an imperfect tendency for participation
and institutions to strengthen or weaken in broad patterns. The four ideal
types I propose are simply commonly observed variations. While it is not
difficult to name exceptions, cluster analysis of data on almost 100
countries shows that they can be classified into four groups reflecting
those variations. We do not have data on every country, and some cases
do stretch the boundaries of their groups; I have included some such
countries among the case studies for that reason. There is no suggestion
that corruption within the groups is identical in every case. The approach
is only a way of asking whether we can use evidence on participation and
institutions to identify groups of countries coherent enough to guide the
case studies that are the real test of the scheme.
Other questions might arise regarding my emphasis on the state. States
do vary in strength, credibility, and day-to-day significance, both among
and within countries, and in a global system even the most powerful are
scarcely autonomous entities. But states remain significant – why else
would people go to the expense and risk of corrupting them? Variations in
the integrity (in its most basic sense) and autonomy of states are reflected,
imperfectly, in our data on institutions. Still, treating whole countries as
units of analysis assumes a significance for the nation-state, and a degree
of uniformity within each one, that may be inappropriate particularly
where corruption is most severe.
Do the cases differ in expected ways? For those countries I have tried to
identify the most critical corruption issues, following the idea of systemic
corruption problems laid out in chapter 2 – that is, emphasizing corruption
issues most important for democratic and economic development. In
most cases, the literature reflected general consensus as to the most
important kinds of corruption to be considered. (At the same time there
is considerable overlap at some levels: countries in all four groups have
police corruption, for example.) The goal is to study qualitative variations:
who abuses wealth and power, in search (or defense) of what, and
with what consequences? The risk, of course, is that a strategy aimed at
identifying contrasts will be disposed toward finding them. I have tried to
avoid that temptation by looking at countries within each group
that differ in important ways, and by specifying in advance the sorts of
variations I expected to find.