CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Elite Cartels 115
Botswana: an Elite Cartel success story?
Nowhere is the need to understand contrasting syndromes of corruption
quite as urgent as in Africa. In the face of both continuing scandals and
numerous proclamations of reform, and of the political and economic
damage corruption can work, it is too easy to ignore qualitative contrasts
(Boone, 2003, spells out many variations among African states and their
relationships to society). Thus, we are often told that there is something
distinctive about ‘‘African corruption’’ (often contrasted to Asian cases)
and that there is an immense amount of it. The latter may well be true, but
there are variations; the former, while an attractive ex post explanation for
African troubles and Asian development (Sindzingre, 2005), is unproven.
A look at Botswana’s Elite Cartel corruption, and at its relatively successful
record of development and self-government over the past two generations,
makes it clear that we need to re-examine both assertions.
Cattle, diamonds, and tradition
Botswana’s 1.6 million citizens are scattered across a dry but diamondrich
land nearly the size of Texas. At independence in 1966 it was one of
the world’s ten poorest societies; in the decades since, however, it has
consistently ranked among the fastest-growing economies (Good, 1992,
1994; Danevad, 1995; Samatar and Oldfield, 1995; Tsie, 1996). Cattle
and diamonds have enabled Botswana to climb into the middle-income
ranks, and indeed the country has at times experienced social strains
resulting from growth (Good, 1992: 69). Indices show that it is widely
regarded as an African anti-corruption success story: while measurement
issues are as intractable in Botswana as anywhere else, relatively effective
state and social institutions apparently help keep the problem under
control (Good, 1994). So do political loyalties of several sorts: leaders
committed to national development (Rotberg, 2004: 15), with traditional
roots in society but also drawn together by corrupt incentives, have been
able to govern effectively.
Botswana is of interest not so much because of its amount of corruption –
although the country did experience some significant scandals in the
early and mid-1990s – but rather because it illustrates both the Elite
Cartels syndrome and a case that differs from typical images of Africa.
Corruption in Botswana has helped interlink elites in the face of
increasing political competition and market activity, and in a setting of
only moderately strong institutions. That security, in turn, has helped a
development-minded leadership produce rapid and sustained economic
growth (Tsie, 1996), a pattern found in Korea. And like pre-tangentopoli