CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Influence Markets 77
What of the longer-term consequences? Germany’s political processes
are fluid and competitive, and yet in recent years it has been slow to adapt
to new realities, especially as regards the affordability of the extensive
social benefits that are so central to public acceptance of the Sozialstaat.
Absorbing the old East has been a major burden and has given rise to a
variety of resentments. Repeated revelations of influence-dealing at high
levels (and at high prices) together with weak legal restraints and public
tolerance or resignation suggests that here too Influence Markets extensively
accommodate elite interests, but at considerable cost in terms of
political responsiveness. Indeed, whether Germany can make needed
economic and social policy adaptations over the next decade may tell
us, in large part, just how extensive those costs have been.
Influence markets in Japan: leaders, factions, and tribes
Japan too has Influence Markets in which political figures help connect
private interests, many of them businesses, to decisionmakers within a
strong, well-institutionalized state. Here too political contributions, some
of them legal, are integral to that process. But there are important contrasts
too. Japan’s Influence Markets have produced extensive, lucrative, and
factionalized corruption. A strong, centralized, and remote bureaucracy
has raised the value of mediation by political faction leaders who cultivate
their own bureaucratic and parliamentary networks. Factionalism in the
Diet dates back to the rise of electoral politics in the 1890s (Mitchell, 1996:
131), and in society at large far longer than that. But for many years
modified one-party rule and an unusual electoral system that forced
candidates within a given party to compete with each other encouraged
‘‘money politics’’ on a spectacular scale. Japan illustrates key elements
of Influence Market corruption and also tests the boundaries of this
syndrome, showing us ways in which Influence Markets reflect variations
in participation, institutions, and historical-cultural characteristics.
Corruption is nothing new in Japan. Mitchell (1996) shows that it was
as much a fact of political life in pre-modern days as during the current
era. In 1914 a major scandal involved the Siemens industrial combine and
naval procurement decisions (Johnson, 1995: 194; Mitchell, 1996:
28–31). Nine of the fifteen LDP Prime Ministers elected between 1955,
when the modern party system was established, and the political breakup
of 1993 were implicated in major scandals (Boisseau, 1997: 132);
national scandals surfaced almost annually during that period
(Mitchell, 1996: 109). Police corruption has been a continuing concern,
extensive wrongdoing can occur at the local and prefectural levels, and
some observers spot a worrisome trend toward more wrongdoing by