CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

200 Syndromes of Corruption
for example, do not have to pass through an Oligarch and Clan ‘‘stage’’ as
they pursue reform.
Comparing the four corruption syndromes to the development ideal
can suggest a number of strategic steps for dealing with each, along with
some initiatives to be avoided.
Influence Markets
In Influence Market countries institutions are strong, legitimate, and in
the case of the bureaucracy, relatively autonomous – enough so that
political elites find their own access attracts rents from economic interests.
Reformers enjoy a number of advantages: liberalization of politics
and markets is more or less a fait accompli, minimizing both the sorts of
systemic changes and imbalances experienced in many other societies
and lucrative squeeze points defended by powerful entrenched corrupt
interests. Prescriptions for improving state functions, law enforcement,
and transparency are generally workable and enjoy broad support.
But corruption remains in these systems. Specific activities – the ‘‘pay
to play’’ system of petty payoffs in several American states and many
localities, the most scandalous political finance practices of Germany and
Japan, or at another level the police corruption that occurs in many
advanced democracies – do not fundamentally undermine prosperity.
But popular suspicion of politics and political finance processes in the
United States, and the incumbent advantages and lack of competition
among parties apparent at many levels in our Influence Market cases, are
not just minor problems but rather connections between wealth and
power that erode the quality of democracy. In many democracies, particularly
the presidential and federal systems, points of access abound; but
as access becomes a tradable commodity those who cannot buy into the
game become suspicious, as the poll data cited in chapter 4 suggest.
Accountability weakens, and government’s role as social referee and
defender of fair play – the role envisioned by consensus development
policy – loses credibility. Recent corporate scandals in the United States
and elsewhere, executive compensation that is excessive by any commonsense
standard yet bears little relation to company performance, and
cavalier treatment of rank-and-file employees are examples of such developments.
Many of these problems do not even involve illegality – a sign of
indiscriminate liberalization? – but to the extent that they are linked to
systemic corruption issues in the public’s eyes they impair the public
credibility of institutions and the efficacy of citizen participation.
Influence Markets diverge from our developmental ideal primarily on
the participation side. Electoral turnout levels in many established