CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Influence Markets 85
nearly impossible. But that lack of accountability may have indirect
economic costs to the extent that governments find it difficult (or unnecessary)
to change policies in response to economic change (on Japan’s
political and economic prospects see Mann and Sasaki, 2002; Katz,
2003). As long as growth was rapid and living standards continued to
rise, voters may have concluded that their bargain with the state, and with
the LDP that mediated between it and society, was a good one. But as
Japan’s economic tides have rolled out in the past decade resentment of
corruption has grown. Mitchell (1996: xvii, 157) is undoubtedly correct
in arguing that genuine reform will require not just new electoral laws, but
rather fundamental changes in relationships between wealth and power.
The future of Japanese corruption is difficult to predict. Weaker factions
and a more pluralistic pattern of influence within the LDP, enhanced interparty
competition, and more decisive national elections could produce a
more decentralized Influence Market – perhaps like that of the United
States. The frequency of bribery and the amounts changing hands might
remain high by American standards, but individual politicians – most
with little bureaucratic clout to put on the market – running against real
competitors from other parties in single-member districts would not
command bribes on the scale seen before 1993. LDP and zoku membership
would be less saleable assets. If people and businesses in Japan are now
less dependent upon the state (Schoppa, 2001) that too might check
Influence Market corruption. Japanese politics will remain factionalized,
and the power of the central state bureaucracy will continue to be a fact of
life, but corruption may come to look more like that of other Influence
Market countries (Cox, Rosenbluth, and Theis, 1999:56).
But another, more pessimistic scenario is also possible. Mishima (1998)
argues that the high status and remoteness of the bureaucracy helped
‘‘discipline’’ policies during the LDP’s years of dominance, but notes that
bureaucrats are now somewhat more accessible and ‘‘conciliatory’’ to the
political world. As a consequence, Mishima argues, the bureaucracy has
also become less effective in making and implementing policy. Enhanced
bureaucratic transparency, we might speculate, could make such a situation
worse – particularly if such efforts multiply the points of access to
officials and policy processes, and if an increasingly competitive political
process creates more intermediaries seeking to cultivate bureaucratic
friendships. At worst, Influence Markets could turn into a disjointed set
of uncoordinated monopolies (Shliefer and Vishny, 1993) – potentially far
more unpredictable and harmful in economic terms than the pre-1993
model (see also Campos, Lien, and Pradhan, 1999; Pascha,1999: 16).
While it is hard to say how likely that outcome is, it would ironically be
partly a consequence of the post-1993 reforms.