CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

56 Syndromes of Corruption
market democracies too but are perceived as more corrupt, and as a group
have lower (and more scattered) human development rankings. Group 3
(fig. 3.3) is more tightly clustered with the majority (notably, non-African
cases) gathered in a moderately high-corruption/high-development
region. Group 4 (fig. 3.4), while not significantly worse on the TI index
than Group 3, scores lowest in terms of human development and – likely
in part because of the varying agendas of undemocratic leaders – is the
least tightly clustered. That group displays an intriguing division between
a group of several Islamic societies with more moderate corruption and
development scores (China is in that region too) and another, tighter
group in the lower right area that includes a number of African states.
That contrast too will also be a focus of discussion later on.
In a perfect world these clusters would be tighter and more clearly
distinct from each other. But the goal here is not to explain variations in
corruption indices as such; rather it is to suggest that knowing something
about participation and institutions in a country adds to our understanding
of corruption – or, at least, sharpens our questions. The qualitative
contrasts not captured by the indices are the major concern of this book
and will be brought out in chapters 4–7.
Contrasts in other development indicators also support that view.
(Tables A–C, presenting the data on which the following discussion
is based, appear in appendix B, pp. 225–227). Group 1 countries
(‘‘Influence Markets’’), in aggregate, are stable, well-institutionalized
democracies with free economies; governments are rated as effective and
as intervening in the economy relatively judiciously. Rule of law is firmly in
place, leaders face significant political competition and constraints on their
powers, and critics are able to demand accountability effectively. These are
prosperous societies providing a high quality of life; they enjoy a favorable
position in world markets, and their experiences thus differ considerably
from those of societies more exposed to outside economic interests. While
none of these indicators sheds light directly upon corrupt processes,theyare
broadly consistent with the ‘‘Influence Markets’’ scenario: wealth interests
are powerful, but the state is well-institutionalized and corruption does not
seem to undermine the system. That regulatory activities are relatively
narrow in scope and comparatively high-quality suggests that officials are
less likely to use such powers arbitrarily.
The suggestion here is not that these societies have solved the corruption
problem: the United States in particular has experienced a rash
of regulatory failings linked to private-sector fraud. Instead, Group 1
corruption seems relatively contained both within the institutional framework
and in its consequences. The longevity of these systems suggests
both that they have developed a working balance between wealth and