CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

208 Syndromes of Corruption
reform will be risky for reformers and society as a whole, and there is no
guarantee that such willful politicians would pursue democratic goals. As
a result political competitors and international investors stay home;
development is uneven and discontinuous, benefiting the few at the
expense of the many; and elections and periodic reform campaigns give
citizens little real recourse against corruption. The ‘‘consensus package’’
of reforms is unlikely to work in such a setting, and indeed may well make
corruption worse and development even more imbalanced. What, if anything,
can be done?
Rather than aiming directly at eliminating corruption and firing up
market and political competition, the initial strategy might be to reduce
insecurity while creating legitimate alternatives to corrupt ways of pursuing
and defending self-interest. In the short to middle term that means
strengthening institutions that serve as guarantors for legitimate economic
deals and political rights. In the economy emphasis can be placed on
property rights, sound banks and currency, market-oversight bodies,
bond and equity markets, reliable and fair tax collection, and on building
business and trade associations capable of developing codes of practice
backed up by rewards and sanctions. Basic improvements to the judiciary
and law enforcement are top priorities. On the political and social side civil
liberties, a free and independent press, protection for citizens and whistleblowers
who report corruption, and ombudsmen and citizen advice programs
may increase the sense of security. These initiatives will not make the
oligarchs go away, but they might reduce incentives to violence, stem
capital flight, and bring more economic and political activity back within
official arenas. For ordinary citizens they can gradually open up legitimate
alternatives to corrupt treatment and influence. By contrast, attacking the
opportunities that have given rise to oligarchs, or confiscating their gains –
the ‘‘strong hand’’ option – would defeat the purpose of political and
market transitions and might create more disorder.
In the longer run the goal is to shift corruption toward less disruptive
forms while building political settlements capable of withstanding its
effects. That sort of transition can ease insecurities not only for citizens
and reformers but also for national leaders and oligarchs themselves.
From the standpoint of the latter it would become possible to govern in
a more predictable and credible fashion – perhaps as an Elite Cartel.
Oligarchs, able to deal with officials who are better able to ‘‘deliver’’ in
legitimate as well as illegitimate ways, need spend less time building and
rewarding personal followings and cultivating linkages with political
families or drug gangs; many will find incentives to shift their activities
in legitimate directions. More effective markets, courts, and guarantees of
property rights would discourage raiding of other oligarchs’ holdings.