CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

From analysis to reform 215
Are we there yet?
How do we know whether reform works? The question has no simple
answer. I suggest, however, that we should avoid using opinion-based
corruption indices to track change. How closely such figures correspond
to actual corruption is open to considerable dispute, and the accuracy
with which they reflect change is even more unproven (Johnston, 2001a).
Moreover, such indices are oriented toward bribery, often at high levels
and involving international trade, and thus tell us less about some kinds of
corruption than others. Indeed, a country that mounts a serious offensive
against corruption may well find that its perception ratings suffer as legal
proceedings, long-suppressed evidence, and public reaction begin to
make headlines. Surveys of the corruption experiences of households,
businesses, and officials are a better strategy in many respects, but they
are expensive and must be repeated frequently. The societies that need
such data most may be least able to afford them.
A more feasible approach is to focus on aspects of government that
create incentives to corruption and reflect its effects (Klitgaard et al.,
2000; Johnston, 2005b). A licensing process that takes seven weeks and
involves thirty-two steps is an indirect indicator of problems: the delay
itself (often contrived) creates incentives to pay up while each step is a
potential squeeze point for extortion. A government that pays twice as
much for petrol or concrete as its neighbor or charges suspiciously low
prices for its crude oil is either experiencing or inviting corrupt dealings. If
a tax returns only half the revenue it is projected to yield, or if calculations
and collections involve wide discretion, the same suspicions hold.
Indicators of this sort point out areas of vulnerability and can help
gauge the effects of reforms. If the licensing process is cut back to five
steps and four days, institutions have been improved because reasons to
give and opportunities to get have been curtailed. If prices a government
pays for asphalt fall toward the norm, incentives and opportunities for
kickbacks are being reduced. Routinely gathering and publishing such
indicators is itself an institution-building process. Inviting citizens to rate
the quality of services they receive, as in the ‘‘citizen report card’’ system
for the local government of Bangalore, India (Wagle and Shah, 2003),
builds popular participation not just in reform but in government generally.
Officials who produce better services can take political credit for
doing so – the real source of political will – and synergy between participation
and institutions may begin to build.
A further hint about assessing progress can be found in the basic notion
of syndromes of corruption. A shift from a more- to a less-disruptive form
of corruption – which, as noted, need not necessarily move through all