CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

From analysis to reform 203
incumbents might benefit from a system in which they enjoy more public
credibility. Whatever our choices the public must be educated in realistic
terms as to what reforms can and cannot accomplish, and about citizens’
own responsibilities in making the system work. Campaign finance legislation
in the United States has often been accompanied by ringing promises
of a new era of clean politics, raising expectations that give way to
deeper cynicism when it becomes clear that fundamentally not much has
changed.
That, in turn, points to a deeper problem. Influence Market societies
have checked corruption in part by legalizing the political role of wealth;
their liberalized economies generally function well too, due in no small
part to strong state institutional frameworks. But not surprisingly, the
policies issuing from the political process favor monied interests in many
ways. Whether or not such policies are sound, they may well be seen by
many citizens as the results of unfair or corrupt influence: in democracies
as elsewhere corruption issues are a tempting way to criticize a regime
without directly challenging its power or claims to rule. Thus affluent
market democracies, for all their accomplishments, may be disposed
toward policies that will continually undermine the public credibility of,
and participation in, politics.
Influence Market countries need to look to their own problems in
another sense too. Many of their most prominent businesses have historically
been deeply involved in corruption elsewhere. Indeed, before the
recent OECD treaty several affluent countries allowed firms not only to
pay bribes abroad but to deduct them from their tax bills at home. The
OECD treaty is a welcome change, as is a similar convention among the
members of the Organization of American States, but global economic
integration continues, as does contention among economic powers for
export markets, while the push for liberalization may further weaken
states vis-à-vis private wealth. As affluent countries and international
organizations pursue reform they must look beyond trends in GDP per
capita as measures of human wellbeing, and take care not to eviscerate the
institutions of developing countries. They must also recognize the importance
of open, competitive politics, not just as the means toward various
development ends but as something immensely valuable in itself.
Elite Cartels
Elite Cartel cases have market economies and increasingly open politics,
for the most part, but top figures often collude behind a façade of political
competition and colonize both the state apparatus and sections of the
economy. This corruption syndrome is not without its risks and costs, as