CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

156 Syndromes of Corruption
private domains are porous or, in effect, non-existent. Indeed, many
Official Moguls operate in a realm between state and society, using
power and resources that are neither clearly public nor private (Johnston
and Hao, 1995). Top-level offices are useful mostly to create monopolies of
various sorts that are then exploited with few restraints. Some monopolies
may be small-scale affairs while others may allow Official Moguls and their
business clients to dominate major segments of an economy.
The results are distinctive kinds of connections between wealth and
power. Seeking bureaucratic influence through payments to political
intermediaries, as in our Influence Market cases, is usually pointless.
The official policy process often bears little resemblance to reality, and
those with political power or backing are out for themselves. Top figures in
Official Mogul countries need not form cartel-style networks because
political opposition is weak at best; indeed in many cases there is no
doubt who is in control. Their clients become specialists, exploiting
fragments of state authority and opportunities opened up by their
political backers. And unlike Oligarchs who must continually find ways
to reward and discipline their Clans, and to protect their gains, Official
Moguls’ followers have few alternatives and their claims to wealth and
property face little real challenge.
The costs of impunity
Official Mogul corruption is driven by the unconstrained abuse of
political and, by extension, official power. There may be one clearly dominant
figure, as in Suharto’s Indonesia, or more numerous Moguls operating
their own monopolies in a more uncoordinated fashion, as in China.
They often have personal clienteles including relatives, business people,
and local leaders, but there is little political reason to share spoils with
mass constituencies in the manner of machine bosses. Economic opportunities
are growing in these societies (see table 7.1), but these cases lack
the political accountability and strong institutions required for an orderly
market economy. Opposing corruption can thus be risky business, and even
those citizens who bitterly resent it may leave the heavy lifting to others.
Corruption of this type is often large-scale and free-wheeling, crossing
international borders as well as those between the state and economy.
Indeed, liberalization of politics and economies has exacerbated corruption
problems in this group, as we shall see in the cases of Kenya and
Indonesia. Like corrupt figures elsewhere, Official Moguls build monopolies
(Klitgaard, 1988): one politician or his client may claim an entire
segment of industry while another may simply control the issuance of a
valuable permit in a local office. But these figures have few competitors