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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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Elite Cartels 97<br />

The rapid rise in oil prices that began in that year spurred laws aimed<br />

at energy conservation, the development <strong>of</strong> alternative energy sources<br />

(particularly nuclear), and limiting price increases. All were threats to<br />

petroleum refiners and marketers, and Unione Petrolifera, their business<br />

association, went on the <strong>of</strong>fensive by paying bribes (tangenti) to the<br />

governing parties. ENEL, the state electricity combine, engaged in similar<br />

activities. Some <strong>of</strong> that money reached party treasuries, but more<br />

stayed with party leaders and top bureaucrats.<br />

While investigations revealed bribery reaching higher into the party and<br />

state hierarchies than many had realized, the scandal might have been<br />

‘‘more <strong>of</strong> the same, only more so’’ had it not been for the reform response.<br />

In 1974 Law number 195 (also boosted by revelations <strong>of</strong> bribery by<br />

Lockheed, which sought to sell C-130 military transports to Italy) outlawed<br />

contributions from public-sector corporations to parties and instituted<br />

a new combination <strong>of</strong> public funding and disclosure <strong>of</strong> private<br />

contributions. But the public funding was vastly inadequate, voluntary<br />

private contributions were low, as always, and disclosure was widely<br />

ignored. Moreover, the law did not change Italy’s longstanding policy<br />

<strong>of</strong> parliamentary immunity to criminal prosecution. Deprived <strong>of</strong> legitimate<br />

funds from public corporations, faced with insufficient public and<br />

private contributions, and guaranteed immunity, party and faction leaders<br />

turned to illicit funding. Many observers date the expansion and<br />

increasing organization <strong>of</strong> corruption in Italy from this legislation (Hine,<br />

1995: 185–186, 191; Rhodes, 1997: 56–65; Golden and Chang, 2001:<br />

595–597; Pujas and Rhodes, 2002: 745; Golden, 2003: 208–209).<br />

The activities <strong>of</strong> Michele Sindona and the P2 Masonic Lodge in the<br />

1970s and early 1980s revealed extensive links between corruption and<br />

violence, implicating not only organized crime but also terror cells and<br />

state security forces. Sindona was an international private banker whose<br />

fortune was built partially upon political bribery and shady capital, and<br />

partly upon his role as the Vatican’s banker. When his empire collapsed in<br />

1978 he was jailed and his businesses went into liquidation. The <strong>of</strong>ficial<br />

overseeing that process was murdered, however, and Sindona himself<br />

died in prison under suspicious circumstances – a suicide, according to<br />

security forces. A series <strong>of</strong> political murders during the late 1970s raised<br />

further suspicions, as did investigations <strong>of</strong> the P2 Masonic Lodge, a<br />

largely secret body whose membership included not only police, security,<br />

and party <strong>of</strong>ficials, but also suspected fascists. P2 was implicated in the<br />

1982 collapse <strong>of</strong> Banco Ambrosiano, Roberto Calvi’s financial conglomerate,<br />

which also involved suspicious deaths and had financial repercussions<br />

reaching from London to the Vatican. Subsequent tax scandals, the<br />

murder <strong>of</strong> an investigating journalist, and oil-related bribery and

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