CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

42 Syndromes of Corruption
Influence Market corruption Influence Markets deal in access to,
and influence within, strong state institutions; often politicians serve as
middlemen, putting their connections out for rent in exchange for contributions
both legal and otherwise.
Mature market democracies offer extensive political and economic
opportunities. They are undergoing only slight liberalization, as there is
not much left to be done, and generally have strong, legitimate institutions.
They resemble each other in important ways, which may help
explain why they are often held up as reform ideals. Legitimate constitutional
frameworks, political competition, free news media, strong civil
societies, and open economies do help check abuses. But many of these
countries have not so much ‘‘solved’’ the corruption problem as they
developed states and political systems accommodating to wealth interests,
fitting the rules to the society as well as persuading people to
follow the law. Most economic dealings take place entirely within their
private sectors under rules much less demanding than those of the public
sector, while the political influence of wealth follows well-established
channels.
Corruption in well-institutionalized market democracies – or at least,
the high-level bribery that tends to influence corruption index scores –
will be the exception, not the rule, and is unlikely to thwart development
(although it is hardly cost-free: see chapter 4). But these societies still
have corruption problems worth worrying about. Some are global: banks
and investment markets in Influence Market countries are often the
repositories, or participate in the laundering, of corrupt gains from elsewhere,
and their multinational businesses have made illicit deals in many
other societies. Most, however, are domestic, and can at times be quite
serious. Influence Market corruption revolves around access to, and
advantages within, established institutions, rather than deals and connections
circumventing them. Strong institutions reduce the opportunities,
and some of the incentives, to pursue extra-systemic strategies, while
increasing the risks; moreover the very power of those institutions to
deliver major benefits and costs raises the value of influence within
them. The role of competitive politics in this variety of corruption is
complex. It can allow citizens to oust a corrupt government, but the
costs of running for office create incentives for politicians to put their
connections and expertise up for rent, and for parties to keep competition
under control.
Influence Markets thus work mostly ‘‘within the system,’’ another
factor contributing to the relatively favorable corruption scores these
societies receive. Power-oriented corruption will focus on winning offices
and influencing those who hold them; corruption in pursuit of wealth will