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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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4 Influence Markets: influence for rent,<br />

decisions for sale<br />

The value <strong>of</strong> access<br />

Influence Market corruption revolves around the use <strong>of</strong> wealth to seek<br />

influence within strong political and administrative institutions – <strong>of</strong>ten,<br />

with politicians putting their own access out for rent. In market democracies<br />

many people have interests to pursue and the means with which to do<br />

so, and points <strong>of</strong> public–private access proliferate. Where institutions are<br />

strong and credible the overwhelming majority <strong>of</strong> advocacy takes place<br />

within accepted limits, but Influence Market societies also have evolved in<br />

ways accommodating to political and economic elites. This corruption<br />

syndrome thus does not ordinarily threaten the viability <strong>of</strong> institutions or<br />

the broader system; indeed, to do so would devalue the access at stake.<br />

The stakes are the details <strong>of</strong> policy – whether a program will be funded, a<br />

contract awarded, a group declared exempt from a tax, or the rules <strong>of</strong> a<br />

program changed. Private parties do <strong>of</strong>fer bribes and <strong>of</strong>ficials practice<br />

extortion, but in most Influence Market countries such actions are the<br />

exception, not the rule, or are confined to specific agencies and decisions.<br />

At times it can be difficult to distinguish legal political contributions and<br />

routine ‘‘constituent service’’ by elected representatives from corrupt dealings,<br />

a fact contributing to market democracies’ favorable scores on indices<br />

that emphasize outright bribery. That does not mean bureaucrats in<br />

Influence Market countries never collude with elected <strong>of</strong>ficials and interest<br />

groups.Butitisusuallyeasierandlessriskyforaprivateinteresttocurryfavor<br />

through political donations than to seek out biddable bureaucrats. That<br />

service is part <strong>of</strong> what a corrupt politician <strong>of</strong>fers. For bureaucrats clearly<br />

illicit deals can be risky; friendships with powerful politicians or the hope<br />

<strong>of</strong> moving into business in the future may be the preferred path to wealth.<br />

The argument <strong>of</strong> this chapter is emphatically not that political money is<br />

inherently corrupting: in democracies donations are a legitimate form <strong>of</strong><br />

advocacy, and competitive mass campaigns cost money. But even if all<br />

funds flow through legal channels there can still be major corruption<br />

concerns. The perception that abuses are common, and the citizen<br />

60

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