CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

70 Syndromes of Corruption
Mo st incumbe nts se eking re-elect ion win easily. Betw een 1980 and
2004, the sha re of Hou se incumbe nts seeking re-ele ction and winning
ran ged between 90.5 an d 98.8 percent, and the share winning with at
leas t 60 percent of the vot e ranged bet ween 65.2 and 88.0 perce nt.
In 2004, on ly five incumbent s were def eated (redis tricting forced two
othe r inc umbents to run agai nst eac h ot her). Nearly a quarte r of Hou s
incumbe nts, in most yea rs, face token opposit ion or none at all. In
the Senate , re-election rates are only somewha t lower: in 1980, the year
of a Republic an landslide large enou gh to ou st an incumbe nt Presid ent,
64.0 perce nt of Senators runn ing f or re-elect ion won, 40 perce nt ta king
six votes out of te n, or more. Between 1982 and 2004 the perce ntage
of incumbent s winni ng their re-election campa igns ranged bet ween
75.0 and 96.9. In 2004, 25 of 26 Senators se eking re-e lection were
victorious, and 69.2 percent of them topped 60 percent of the vote
(Common Cause, 2002; Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin, 2002; Campaign
Finance Institute, 2004).
Incumbent advantage is less decisive in presidential races, which
attract politically established challengers and major donors, and where
incumbents are limited to two terms. Here the law does not so much
enshrine incumbents as prop up the present party system. New parties
and independent candidates face a high threshold (5 percent of the
popular vote) to qualify for even a fraction of the public funding given
to candidates of the two established parties, and of course can only claim
such funds after the election. Had today’s rules been in place in 1860,
Abraham Lincoln might well have run as a Whig.
Incumbent success may reflect effectiveness at working for a state or
district, good constituent service, and the accumulated name recognition
that flows from incumbency itself. But if challengers so rarely win
and are unlikely to attract contributions that will discourage all but
the wealthiest would-be legislators from mounting a serious run.
Campaigns offering a wide range of viewpoints offered by viable candidates
have become the exception. The role of contributors is also
affected: incumbents know they can win with or without a given contributor,
can outspend most challengers with ease, and therefore owe
that contributor nothing. Seasoned lobbyists and individual contributors
virtually never make quid pro quo offers, and scorn anyone who
would. Indeed, one study concluded that incumbents’ security is so
extensive, and donors’ leverage is so slight, that contributions more
closely resemble protection payments than legalized bribes (Keim and
Zardkoohi, 1988). Many donors are critical of the current system and
the relationships it creates (Green, 1998) – not a result one would
expect if donations simply bought favorable policy. The real corruption