CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

218 Syndromes of Corruption
down by members of the aristocracy weary of royal abuses. Critical
notions of accountable government in England emerged out of a blood
feud between crown and parliament over taxation, religion, and the
accountability of royal ministers (Roberts, 1966: 91; Johnston, 1993) –
not as reforms but as clubs to swing in a political brawl. Similarly, election
reform in nineteenth-century Britain – the secret ballot, limits on expenditures,
and the long struggle over rotten boroughs – was in part aimed at
checking the ‘‘old corruption,’’ but also helped party leaders impose order
on, and control the costs of, the growing nationwide competition for votes
(O’Leary, 1962; Finer, 1975; Rubinstein, 1983; Cox, 1986). Botswana
by most measures ought to have more corruption, in more disruptive
forms, than it seems to experience. Its working political framework was
no one’s design for reform or good government, but rather an elite
settlement, rooted in society itself, that reconciled important groups
and values and provided a coherent basis for effective rule. In Korea it
is more difficult to say whether the glass is half full or half empty in
corruption terms, but there is little doubt that the country is better off
than it was thirty years ago. Its transitions followed no overall plan but
rather were arrangements in which important leaders and factions of a
contentious society had their stakes.
Ultimately corruption and reform are questions of justice. Can government
protect the rights and opportunities of the many against the interests
of a few, and can it be held accountable? Are boundaries between
public and private power sufficient to prevent either from overrunning the
other? A generation of liberalization sought to protect private interests
from an encroaching state, but in many places has weakened key public
institutions and political constraints, inviting abuses of private power.
Too often we have pretended that giving free rein to private interests will
quickly create self-regulating substitutes for government. But who then
protects the weak? Shifting that burden to civil society, perversely, can be
a way of blaming the victims.
For that reason reform must ultimately involve deep democratization.
By that I mean not just competitive elections or transparency schemes,
valuable as they are, but rather enabling citizens to pursue and defend
their values and interests freely, and to settle upon acceptable institutions
and ways of using wealth and power. Citizens, of course, are not automatically
endowed with collective wisdom. They must want to build and
sustain those settlements, and to endure the effort and risk that are
involved. But they are more likely to do so in defense of their own wellbeing
than in the name of ‘‘being good.’’ It is incumbent upon anyone
concerned with government, development, and democracy to make sure
such opportunities are accessible, credible, and safe. There is a wide gap