CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Official Moguls 183
higher on a corruption scale than other societies does not capture the
impunity, the weakness of institutions and vulnerability of society, or the
far-reaching consequences of corruption there. Indeed, it is hard to know
just what ‘‘more corruption’’ means: we can easily imagine a system (such
as Kenya’s, perhaps) in which, because of the weakness of countervailing
forces, a small number of corrupt deals at high levels have as much
societal effect as does widespread ‘‘money politics’’ in Japan. Further,
China shows that within the Official Moguls syndrome basic notions of
corruption can become very broad and diffuse. Using index numbers to
compare such cases and changes seems pointless.
Another important contrast is that Official Mogul societies would seem
to be the most vulnerable, among our four groups, to state capture
(Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2000; Kaufmann, Hellman, Jones,
and Schankerman, 2000). Elite Cartels may colonize parts of the state,
but they are still coalitions of differing elite interests; and, judging by our
statistical indicators, official institutions retain moderate levels of
strength and capacity. In Oligarch and Clan societies the state is very
weak but corrupt influences are fragmented and contentious. Moi’s
Kenya and Suharto’s Indonesia, by contrast, were run by and in the
interest of dominant leaders and their personal clients. China is far
more complex; the role of the party in creating the state meant that it
was captured in some respects from the very beginning, but the sheer size
of the society, and of the economy that is emerging, resist control by
anyone at the moment.
It is also clear that Official Mogul cases differ among themselves in
ways we cannot ignore. Moguls’ personal agendas matter a great deal.
Strong institutions, in a bureaucratic and information-oriented age, tend
to resemble each others in important ways, while weak ones come in
many shapes and sizes and can pose a wide variety of problems. The
same is true of liberalizing economies: China’s example shows that such
economies do not immediately become integrated capitalist systems, but
rather can evolve a complex and contradictory mix of market, patrimonial,
and bureaucratic mechanisms that may not be well integrated
with each other and across a given society. Indonesia’s post-Suharto
political liberalization likewise shows that when a dictatorship collapses
elite discipline can go with it. For these reasons the Official Mogul
group is the most diverse of our four.
Still, societies in this group do share a common corruption problem –
officials who can plunder economies and societies with impunity. Perhaps
it is most accurate to say that the consequences of that sort of power can
be very diverse indeed. That is not only an analytical point. If Official
Mogul corruption does differ qualitatively from that found in Influence