28.02.2015 Views

CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

148 <strong>Syndromes</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong><br />

gangs collaborated with police forces and military <strong>of</strong>ficers and undermined<br />

PRI governments in several states (Jordan, 1999), and <strong>of</strong>fered paths to<br />

wealth and power outside <strong>of</strong> the PRI’s direct control. International<br />

responses made matters worse in some ways: interdiction <strong>of</strong> drug shipments<br />

may ironically aid major traffickers by driving out smaller competitors<br />

and lifting market prices (Toro, 1998), and can raise the ante in terms <strong>of</strong><br />

violence. The ‘‘internationalization’’ <strong>of</strong> US drug law enforcement via<br />

interdiction actions in Mexico undermined the autonomy and credibility<br />

<strong>of</strong> Mexican police and drug policy, as both were effectively annexed by<br />

the US (Toro, 1998). By the end <strong>of</strong> the 1990s it was an open question<br />

whether the federal government, the military, or drug lords actually<br />

governed some areas <strong>of</strong> the country (Bailey and Godson, 2000).<br />

Mexico in that era had many formal attributes <strong>of</strong> democracy: elections<br />

hadbeenheldsincethelate1920s,opposition parties <strong>of</strong>fered candidates,<br />

and there was some criticism <strong>of</strong> the government in the press (although <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

answered with <strong>of</strong>ficial harassment). Repression could be violent – notably in<br />

the massacre <strong>of</strong> student protesters in 1968, and in the regime’s dealings with<br />

some indigenous peoples and local opposition groups – but Mexican presidents<br />

hardly fit the stereotypical image <strong>of</strong> Latin American dictators, and<br />

the military generally stayed out <strong>of</strong> the politics. Mexico was, and is, a rapidly<br />

modernizing society in many ways: particularly after 1982 skilled technocrats<br />

became increasingly influential in government. The economic picture,<br />

too, has been hopeful at many points: a long economic expansion took place<br />

between the 1950s and 1970s, in the early 1980s after the oil boom a rapid<br />

take<strong>of</strong>f seemed imminent, and such hopes arose again in the early 1990s.<br />

Still, corruption and crime add to a pervasive sense <strong>of</strong> insecurity in<br />

society (Levy and Bruhn, 2001: 15–20); late in 2004 a mob in a poor<br />

district <strong>of</strong> Mexico City lynched two police <strong>of</strong>ficers and burned them alive,<br />

a scene shown live on television (McKinley, 2004). Elite Cartel-style<br />

abuses, while extensive, had generally stayed under PRI control for<br />

years. But beginning in the 1980s more disruptive, higher-stakes varieties<br />

and a sense <strong>of</strong> impunity spread through sections <strong>of</strong> the hierarchy and<br />

outward into the states, particularly as regards law enforcement. Those<br />

changes had a number <strong>of</strong> causes – notably, rapid economic liberalization<br />

and a significant if slower opening-up <strong>of</strong> politics in the context <strong>of</strong> weak<br />

state institutions and, later, decaying PRI hegemony. The result has been<br />

a shift toward a more disruptive Oligarchs and Clans pattern.<br />

Mexico’s corruption, old and new<br />

PRI leaders used corruption both for self-enrichment and to sustain the<br />

party’s dominance and internal hierarchy. Election fraud, extortion and

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!