CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

48 Syndromes of Corruption
degrees, along with a number of African countries (particularly those
marked by military rule and internal strife). China’s economic reforms
and spectacular growth are well known, but as we shall see in chapter 7
they have been accompanied by extensive corruption, often driven by
officials exploiting segments of an increasingly fragmented party and state
apparatus. In Kenya and Indonesia powerful elites have engaged in
rapacious corruption that has been exacerbated, if anything, by the
launching of competitive elections without the supporting institutions
they require. Other countries in which strong elites have pursued reforms
may be about to escape a high-corruption/low-development trap
(Johnston, 1998): Uganda is no democracy as yet, but it has implemented
important anti-corruption measures and increased opportunities for popular
participation (Ruzindana, 1997). Even during periods of reform,
however, the state (or fragments of it) may remain handy for exploitation
by rulers accountable to no one.
These four corruption syndromes remain ideal types at this point,
meant to describe (and highlight contrasts among) corruption problems
I suggest we will find when participation and institutional factors combine
in certain commonly observed ways. No country will have just one
kind of corruption, and no syndrome will fit any one case in every detail.
All are grounded in the notion that political and economic liberalization
has placed stresses upon institutional frameworks, which themselves vary
considerably in strength.
A few overall contrasts are worth noting too. As we move from Influence
Markets toward Official Moguls we shift from corruption structured along
lines of official roles and processes to that which is scarcely institutionalized
at all. The former seeks to convert wealth into bureaucratic influence or
electoral success, while the latter is the open exploitation of power, and of
the weak by the strong. Influence Market and Elite Cartel corruption
involve repeated transactions and influence or access usable over a long
term; indeed, Elite Cartel corruption may be used primarily to forestall or
at least control change. In Oligarch and Clan and Official Mogul cases,
however, corruption is less predictable, often involving targets of opportunity
in rapidly changing societies or the whims of leaders acting with
impunity. Where institutions are stronger opponents of corruption can
organize, relying upon relatively sound civil liberties, legal frameworks,
and civil societies; where they are weak anti-corruption activity becomes
increasingly risky. Finally, in the latter sorts of cases corruption may be not
the exception but the norm, at least in certain segments of politics and the
economy. More than any other, that contrast suggests the contrasting
expectations, relationships between wealth and power, and reform challenges
to be found among the world’s cases of corruption.