CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

76 Syndromes of Corruption
oil giant Elf-Aquitaine to take over an aging refinery at Leuna, in the old
East, and market its products. Payments to Kohl skimmed from such
dealings amounted to DM2 million or more; his refusal to disclose their
sources led (after Kohl’s election loss in 1999) to his resignation as CDU
honorary chairman, and to major investigations. All three major parties
received payments; one account put the total at DM100 million while one
‘‘bagman’’ claimed that DM85 million went to one party alone.
Take the money and run
These sorts of dealings are aided by relatively weak legal and political
constraints. Germany did introduce new controls on party contributions
in the 1980s, but there are no limits and no bar against contributions by
corporations or in cash (Alemann, 2002). Bribery of Bundestag members is
a legal offense, but the law is not vigorously enforced. Bribery of or through
parties is illegal, with parties obliged to repay illegally received funds plus
penalties to the Presidium of the Bundestag, which will then turn such
sums over to charity (Alemann, 2002). Most of the burden for monitoring
such contributions, however, falls upon the parties themselves (Germany’s
anti-corruption laws and their enforcement are analyzed in GRECO,
2004). Finally, as the cases above suggest, top figures often enjoy de facto
immunity (Seibel, 1997: 89, 94–96): jail terms are rare, criminal charges
are likely to deal with tax evasion rather than bribery, and political careers
may continue with little loss of standing. Edmund Stoiber, CSU Interior
Minister in Bavaria, who admitted in the early 1990s to receiving personal
favors from businesses, went on to become Prime Minister of Bavaria and,
by 2002, CDU/CSU leader and candidate for Chancellor. The dynamics
of German democratization noted above may have devalued democratic
accountability while emphasizing the mere distribution of social benefits
(Seibel, 1997: 96–99); in any event, the resentment of Influence Markets
evident among American citizens is not apparent in Germany.
Germany thus shows how Influence Markets adapt to political realities.
A US Senator or Representative has more policy leverage than an individual
Bundestag member, but in the German system major influence can
be had at higher levels – often, among the leaders of more than one party.
Those leaders and their parties have a common interest in a political and
electoral system in which they often share power, and in continuing to
distribute material benefits. Germany’s economy, too, is distinguished by
the presence of very large private corporations, labor unions, and other
groups with major funds at their disposal. The result is an Influence
Market that flourishes at high levels, crosses party lines, and involves
relatively few risks.