CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

216 Syndromes of Corruption
four types in order – may take a long time to emerge, but is a sign of
stronger, better-balanced participation and institutions. Judging such
trends need not require elaborate data analysis. Instead, it is a matter of
standing the analytical strategy of this book on its head: a country whose
corruption is shifting from Official Mogul corruption toward Elite Cartels
is likely increasing political competition and building a useful political
settlement. An Elite Cartels case that begins to look more like an
Influence Market society is very likely increasing its bureaucratic autonomy
and capacity in useful ways, and may be experiencing a welcome
increase in decisive, well-ordered political competition; it may, on the
other hand, need to carefully monitor the vitality of that competition in
the long run. A country moving from a less to a more disruptive syndrome
may be letting opportunities for participation outpace institutional development
(a move toward Oligarchs and Clans) or allowing participation to
be squelched by dominant political power (Official Moguls). Either way,
an understanding of corruption syndromes and of the underlying problems
that shape them can help us extract the essential good or bad news
from a welter of corruption stories and allegations. By contrast, simply
tracking such changes using a corruption index – to the extent that they
would affect scores at all, which is uncertain – would provide little
diagnostic insight as to what is going wrong in a particular case.
‘‘Deep democratization’’ and reform
The ‘‘consensus package’’ of reforms aimed at liberalizing politics and
markets, and at a small but efficient ‘‘referee state,’’ offers major benefits
to well-organized economic interests but puts immense burdens upon
poor and democratizing societies. Weak states and civil societies are
urged to confront powerful entrenched interests – some of the latter
originating in the very societies urging reform. Affluent market democracies
are offered as reform models but much less is said about how
developing societies get to that goal – what must be done first, what
should be deferred or avoided – or about advanced societies’ own corruption
problems.
I have suggested that an Elite Cartel settlement may be attractive
in some surprising ways. Elite Cartels are only an interim governance
strategy – second-best at most, transitional, and perhaps appropriate only
for some societies. But they are also a halfway situation similar to those
experienced by many affluent market democracies during their own
histories. They may enable high-corruption countries to pursue positive
change on a foundation of elite political alliances before they possess the
official institutions, participation, and legitimacy found in affluent market