CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

160 Syndromes of Corruption
terms of both scope and the size of stakes involved (Hao and Johnston,
1995). Also controlled were basic ideas about what corruption was and
what caused it: in the official view it was a problem of surviving feudal
traditions and bourgeois values, or of individual deviance. Anti-corruption
strategy emphasized well-publicized trials and punishments, political
and ideological discipline efforts, and periodic mass campaigns.
Examples of the latter included the ‘‘Three Antis’’ (corruption, waste,
and bureaucracy) and ‘‘Five Antis’’ movements (bribery, tax evasion,
theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing
economic information) of the early 1950s, and the ‘‘Four Cleans’’ campaign
(work groups’ management of collective property) a decade later
(Hao and Johnston, 2002).
Strong economy, weak institutions
In 1978 Deng Xiaoping’s government launched the market-oriented
reforms that have touched off an economic boom and set the stage for
rapid growth of corruption (Gong, 1994; Goldman and MacFarquhar,
1999; Sun, 2004; Wong, 2004). Centrally planned and controlled prices
and decisions were partially replaced by arrangements allowing goods to
be sold more or less freely once planned criteria had been met. Many
collective work groups were replaced by a ‘‘household responsibility
system’’ and small family-owned businesses were permitted as well.
Some central government subsidies were recast as loans; regional and
local officials acquired more autonomy, both official and otherwise.
Managers could now make personnel and production decisions, and
were free to retain a significant share of profits for their firms. Some
functionaries resisted reform, fearing threats to their status and jobs.
But most benefited from the increased discretion and economic opportunities
it brought them. The national economy was opened to foreign
trade and investment – although contract enforcement and transparency
have yet to approach international standards – and exports became a top
priority. More recently stock markets have been established, and a
scheme was proposed under which citizens would in effect become shareholders
in state enterprises.
But economic reform was also notable for what it did not do.
Distinctions between public and private realms were never particularly
meaningful in pre-reform China, and economic norms were bureaucratic,
political, and therefore ill-suited to markets. Reform, when it
came, fragmented the Leninist party-state but did not build the oversight
and facilitating institutions open markets require. Official profiteering
(guandao) became a major problem, taking on various forms such as