CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

168 Syndromes of Corruption
emergence of an active economic ‘‘gray area’’ between the state and
society, and reinforced the sense of official impunity at many levels.
During the 1990s courts and prosecutors became more active in the
corruption field; periodic announcements of large numbers of cases
investigated and punishments meted out became an integral part of
anti-corruption strategy. More important, however, has been a gradual
change in the role of law itself – not the full development of the rule of law,
but rather an increasing tendency for the leadership to rule by law (Hao,
1999; Feinerman, 2000). The National People’s Congress has been a
more active legislature in recent years, enacting laws on speculation and
bribery, and party leaders have relied more heavily on written standards
as political discipline has lost its edge. A 1995 law created a process
through which victims of official abuse could claim compensation, and
indeed several hundred cases pursued under that law have produced
settlements in favor of citizens. Ironically, corruption may push the
party-state toward greater reliance upon laws and formal regulations as
it copes with the complexity, vigor, and adaptability (at times, even,
nefariousness) of the economic system it has unleashed.
Too much should not be made of such developments. Manion (2004)
points out that law-oriented reform efforts suffer from functional and
jurisdictional tensions arising between the party’s anti-corruption agency
(the Central Discipline Inspection Commission) and that of the state (the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate), and from the leadership’s own mixed
messages and behavior with respect to the importance of laws. Still, to the
extent that officials become bound by written standards instead of by
ideology, if citizens acquire recognized rights and the ability to make
claims upon the regime, and if new limits to self-interest take root,
China might develop the institutions market economies need in order
to thrive without devouring themselves. If standards governing the
sources and uses of power emerge, and acquire credibility, distinct from
the personal will of top leaders, stronger restraints upon Official Moguls
are possible. If corruption comes to be seen as a threat to China’s
economic transformation, rather than just as a byproduct of it, the backing
to sustain reform may be at hand. Those, of course, are systemic
political changes, not just anti-corruption measures.
Corruption control may thus depend upon the one kind of reform
China has yet to try: political reform. China’s path of change will be
very much its own. But involving citizens as an active force shaping
reform, rather than as the audience for mass campaigns, is an essential
first step. Proclaiming standards is one thing; addressing the grievances
citizens have because of corruption is quite another. If impunity is a key
characteristic of Official Mogul corruption, reform will require sustained