CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Oligarchs and Clans 137
and the United States, and sixty years as a strategically important
American client state have led to pervasive corruption. Entrenched oligarchs
and their followings have inhibited the growth of democratizing
movements while their dealings enriched the few at the expense of the
many, distorting development in what ought to be – if only because of aid
received – a far more affluent country.
Over 84 million people live on the more than 7,000 islands of the
Philippine archipelago, but politics and the economy are dominated by
only about eighty families (Riedinger, 1995: 209–210; Sidel, 1997, 2000;
Moran, 1999: 577). Some are landholding provincial dynasties, while
others have risen to prominence more recently through banking or industry;
either way they have frequently plundered a weak and decentralized
state (Girling, 1997; Montinola, 1999; Hutchcroft, 2002, 2003; on
Philippine institutions generally see Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003).
Some oligarchs and their followers have turned segments of the state into
fiefdoms; others have used corrupt influence to keep the state out of their
business dealings; and in other cases they have simply stolen from the
nation. The Marcos era – especially the long period of martial law
(1972–86) – complicated the picture: favored families thrived while
others saw their property and privileges vanish. Such abuses helped
mobilize the ‘‘People Power’’ revolution that brought Marcos down in
1986, and since that time anti-corruption activities have proliferated.
Still, the Oligarch and Clan syndrome remains very much alive,
and indeed some prominent families have done better than ever in
recent years.
Oligarchs in the Philippines: who they are and what they do
Unlike Elite Cartel cases, where a relatively small network governs and
profiteers through the state apparatus, Philippine oligarchs are more
numerous, and much of their power and wealth are derived from outside
the state – to the extent that the distinction makes much difference.
Oligarchs exploit the state much more effectively than the state exploits
them (Hutchcroft, 1991: 424). Guaranteeing corrupt deals and property
rights in a setting of weak institutions is a chronic problem, however, and
thus presidents are handy friends to have. Presidential cronies do very
well indeed: as we shall see, Marcos associates bought out competitors’
corporations at bargain prices and forced other oligarchs out of business
altogether. Marcos himself, and Imelda, ended up as actual or de facto
owners of many such firms.
Violence is part of the story too (Moran, 1999: 582), particularly in
remote areas, but overall the Philippine case is not as wild as the Russian