CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

78 Syndromes of Corruption
bureaucrats themselves (Johnson, 2001: 1–2; Berkofsky, 2002). But a
high-priced market in national bureaucratic influence has been so much a
fact of national political life that many observers term the problem
‘‘structural corruption’’ (kozo oshoku) (Mitchell, 1996: 139–140;
Johnson, 1995: 15, and ch. 9 and 10, accepts the term ‘‘structural’’ but
challenges the ‘‘corruption’’ idea).
Influence-dealing – Japanese style
Japan fit the syndrome particularly well between 1955 and 1993. LDP and
other politicians traded influence and access to the workings of a wellinstitutionalized
bureaucracy for money from business (Johnson, 1995:
202). They used the funds thus obtained for their campaigns; for their
supporters within party factions, in the Diet, and in home constituencies;
for the wining and dining required to cultivate clients in the bureaucracy –
and, of course, for self-enrichment.
But Influence Markets are by no means alike, and Japan’s version reflects
a variety of influences. The pervasiveness of corruption, the large financial
stakes involved, and cultural dimensions too (such as norms of exchange
and attitudes toward authority, the latter shaping both factionalism and
responses to scandals) set Japan apart. The amounts of money involved can
be astonishing: when former LDP Deputy Secretary General Kanemaru
Shin was arrested for tax evasion in 1993, the valuables seized from his
home were worth an estimated ¥3.6 billion, or roughly $30 million.
Boisseau (1997: 133–135) conservatively estimates that toward the end
of LDP dominance in the early 1990s the party was spending about
$8 billion annually to keep its machine running; some of those funds
were raised legitimately but much was not. Kickbacks to LDP politicians
from the winners of public works contracts ran a flat 3 percent of the total
value of the contract (Johnson, 1995: 208). When we consider that in the
mid-1980s domestic construction outlays in Japan totaled ¥53.6 trillion
yearly (Woodall, 1996: 1) – around $225 billion at then-current exchange
rates – or that in the early 1990s around 15 percent of the LDP’s reported
contributions come from real-estate and construction interests, with many
more kept secret (Woodall, 1996: 11), we get a rough sense of the scale of
the process. Major post-war cases include the following (these descriptions
draw upon Johnson, 1995: 194–201, 218–225; Mitchell, 1996: 109–130;
Pascha, 1999: 3–5;Blechinger,2000: 8–9; Johnson, 2000: 60–62, 64–68;
Samuels, 2001: 13).
The Shipbuilding scandal began in 1953 with legislation granting
shipbuilders the right to borrow capital at below-market interest rates.
The following year it was revealed that lobbyists backing that law had