CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Elite Cartels 91
hegemony anchored by the Christian Democratic Party that extended
into the bureaucracy and business as well. Elections and governments
came and went, often in quick succession, but networked elites fed upon,
and provided political cover for, extensive illicit dealings. Italy experienced
significant, if uneven, economic development, but a weak yet heavy
state resisted reform. When change came early in the 1990s, the old party
system collapsed. In Korea an elite network led by the President, but
including top business and military figures (many of whom came from
a particular region of the country), practiced ‘‘money politics’’ with a
vengeance. Democratic pressures were headed off while access to capital
and foreign exchange went to businesses that paid ‘‘quasi-taxes’’ to presidents
and their pet projects. Parties were weak and shifting organizations,
usually the personal creations of leading politicians. From the
mid-1980s onwards, democratization and global economic liberalization
placed the Elite Cartel system under new stresses, driving ‘‘money politics’’
to new highs. Still, Elite Cartel corruption has proven remarkably
durable in Korea. In Botswana corruption has helped a modernizing
traditional elite maintain its internal ties and authority. There have been
significant scandals, but the elite has absorbed or seen off many political
challenges. It has governed effectively and produced impressive economic
growth in what was once one of the world’s poorest countries.
Elite Cartel corruption is by no means ‘‘functional’’ in itself, but it helps
elites retain power. What they do with that power is of course a major
question.
In differing ways Italy, Korea, and Botswana reflect the sorts of system
characteristics discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Table 5.1 presents
statistical indicators comparable to those shown for our Influence
Market cases.
Italy and Botswana are established democracies, as reflected in Polity
scores for 1992 and 2001, while Korea continues its democratizing path.
The three countries are rated nearly identically in terms of economic
liberalization (‘‘Economic Freedom’’), with Italy remaining a marketoriented
society while Korea, and more notably Botswana, shifted toward
the market during the decade. In all three political and economic competition
are extensive. But institutional frameworks, while stronger than
those found in Groups 3 and 4, are considerably weaker than those of
Influence Market cases. Institutional and social capacity scores in table 5.1
range from 58.1 to 60.6, compared to 74.2 to 75.6 for Germany,
Japan, and the United States. Corruption control scores, which range
between 1.20 and 1.45 for the three Influence Market cases in chapter 4,
fall between .33 and .80 for these three cases. The security of property
rights, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality are generally