CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

214 Syndromes of Corruption
unscrupulous leaders and their protégés opens up an intriguing possibility
not available in Elite Cartel or Oligarch and Clan societies. Could
new leaders with an anti-corruption agenda use their unchecked power,
along with a sharp tightening of law enforcement and monitoring of
business excesses, to ‘‘flip’’ an Official Mogul society into a new, lowcorruption
situation? Imagine such a leadership refusing to get involved
in corruption, cracking down on former protégés, and using its power
and resources to support legitimate economic alternatives. Such efforts
could make Moguls more secure by reducing international pressure for
change, and through the social benefits of additional economic growth and
reduced political exploitation. They could even make power more profitable
to the extent that the pool of perquisites, while smaller after reform,
would not have to be shared with clients. Such incentives make this
scenario less fanciful than it might seem.
In the longer term that regime would need to embark on more conventional
forms, increasing the pay of honest officials, judges, customs
officers, and police (perhaps using repatriated proceeds of past corruption?),
enhance transparency and guarantee that citizens and journalists
could take advantage of it without fear, and strengthen the institutions
protecting economic opportunities and gains. It would also have to deal
with the grievances of would-be clients now cut out of their expected
rewards and the resentments by citizens and emergent civil society
groups of mistreatment under the old regime. Still, some such changes –
notably, higher pay for honest service, and a crackdown on corruption
as part of a dash to growth – were implemented in Singapore in a
relatively short time (Quah, 2003), with dramatic results. Rapid, guided
change of this order will be more difficult in large-scale societies;
further, getting such leaders to yield eventually to open and competitive
politics is something that despite its successes Singapore has yet to do.
But few gave Korean democratization much of a chance at the time
Ferdinand Marcos was ousted in the Philippines in 1986, and yet within
two years a breakthrough had occurred. Admittedly, the elements of this
scenario range from the possible to the fanciful to the pathologically
optimistic. But the point is that if we see countries as moving toward a
reform ideal from several different directions rather than along a single
path, many different processes of change can be seen.
Processes of change: ends and means
Two questions remain. How can we assess the effects of anti-corruption
strategies? How can citizens be brought into the process, lest reforms
simply create a few new winners and millions of losers?