CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

84 Syndromes of Corruption
reforms will take some time to assess: public funding provisions took full
effect only at the beginning of 2000, for example. The hoped-for transition
to more unified party competition revolving around clear policy choices has
been slow to materialize (Christensen, 1998), and pork-barrel politics
shows few signs of fading away, particularly at the local level (Fukui and
Fukai, 1996). Meanwhile scandals continue, at times involving top
bureaucrats in ministries such as Foreign Affairs (Berkofsky, 2002).
The systemic political costs of corruption have been considerable,
however. Surveys in 2001 found that only 9 percent of Japanese adults
had confidence in the Diet and only 8 percent in the central bureaucracy
(Johnson, 2001: 4); as recently as 1994 trust in bureaucrats was as high as
44 percent (Tachino, 1999: 14–15). Such results must be viewed in the
context of Pharr’s (2000: 174–175) evidence that political satisfaction
and trust in modern Japan have never been particularly high compared
to other democracies. Still, Pharr shows that misconduct in office, and
not economic problems, poor policy performance, or any fundamental
weakness in civil society, is a primary cause of political disenchantment
in Japan.
There have been some changes in politics, and in the ways scandals
are dealt with, since the 1993 crisis. Single-member constituencies with
new boundaries have weakened ties between some politicians and local
supporters’ groups (koenkai), leaving the latter up for grabs in some
places. Factional leaders are somewhat less able to control individual
Diet members or local voters (Cox, Rosenbluth, and Theis, 1999: 56).
Individual politicians dispute corruption allegations more vigorously,
at times taking legal action, and try to distance themselves from the
wrongdoing of others. Cabinet members are more likely to take responsibility
for bribery within their ministries, and may resign in the wake of
revelations. Disgraced politicians now find it harder to make a comeback
(Blechinger, 1999: 46–53). But Influence Market corruption has in
no way come to an end; instead, it has adapted somewhat to reform
legislation and the realities of post-1993 politics.
Influence markets in Japan: alternative futures
The effects of corruption over the past half-century in Japan are not easy
to assess. As recently as the mid-1990s Johnson (1995: 202; see also
Pascha, 1999: 8–11) could argue with justification that its economic
costs had not been extensive. As in the American case, much of the
damage has been political, and therefore less easily measured.
Competition was largely confined to elite and intra-LDP arenas; voters
had choices, but holding the party accountable at the ballot box was