CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
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38 <strong>Syndromes</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong><br />
institutions influence the kinds <strong>of</strong> corruption we encounter – participants,<br />
relationships among them, benefits at stake, and implications for development.<br />
To search for syndromes <strong>of</strong> corruption is, in effect, to ask what<br />
are the underlying developmental processes, and problems, <strong>of</strong> which a society’s<br />
corruption is symptomatic? Huntington (1968), for example, suggested<br />
years ago that where economic opportunities are more plentiful than<br />
political ones, ambitious people use wealth to seek power. Where political<br />
opportunities abound and economic ones are scarce, by contrast, power<br />
pursues wealth. Where institutions are weak, other contrasts may emerge:<br />
a weak state may be vulnerable to illicit private pressures, unable to<br />
restrain the conduct <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials, or both. Civil society may not exist, or<br />
not be strong enough to sustain social trust and channel demands through<br />
accepted norms and networks. Some states protect property rights effectively<br />
and intervene in the economy in judicious ways; in others, ownership<br />
and contracts mean little while state intervention enriches <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />
and their favored clients. Weak institutions not only allow citizens and<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials to seek illicit gains, at times with impunity; they also create<br />
incentives for more corruption as people seek protection in an uncertain<br />
environment.<br />
Underlying variations in participation and institutions will not determine<br />
every detail <strong>of</strong> a country’s corruption problems: personalities,<br />
events, crackdowns and reforms, and popular responses can all play<br />
roles. International influences, both long-term (e.g. pressures for political<br />
and economic liberalization) and more immediate (the activities <strong>of</strong> multinational<br />
businesses and international aid and lending bodies) are also<br />
critical, as will become apparent in several case studies. Further, some<br />
kinds <strong>of</strong> corruption, such as pay<strong>of</strong>fs and shakedowns involving police and<br />
customs <strong>of</strong>ficials, are found more or less everywhere. I seek a middle level<br />
<strong>of</strong> comparison – to identify, account for, and explore the significance<br />
<strong>of</strong> contrasting corruption issues that are manifestations <strong>of</strong> four major<br />
syndromes. The goal is to know what is at stake in a country’s corruption,<br />
how people and groups pursue, use, and exchange wealth and power, and<br />
how those processes are abetted or constrained by institutions and competing<br />
or opposing interests. Relative amounts <strong>of</strong> corruption, to the extent<br />
that they are even knowable, will be a secondary concern at most.<br />
Four categories<br />
Participation and institutions can combine in a variety <strong>of</strong> ways, and for<br />
every generalization there will be exceptions. The evidence available also<br />
varies widely among societies. The challenge is to identify country categories<br />
broad enough to preserve important commonalities, to avoid