CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
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150 <strong>Syndromes</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong><br />
in scale, frequency, and disruptive potential (Morris, 1991: 123–127).<br />
Ballooning oil prices, for a time, drove a scramble for wealth (Grayson,<br />
1980), while the subsequent ‘‘oil bust’’ intensified contention over a<br />
shrinking pool <strong>of</strong> revenues. The drug trade fueled violence (Toro,<br />
1998: 138–142) and a more unstructured style <strong>of</strong> corruption. Benefits<br />
that might have been distributed within the PRI to keep the peace, or used<br />
to maintain its popular base, were siphoned out <strong>of</strong> the party. Political<br />
violence and corruption <strong>of</strong> law enforcement, at times connected to los<br />
narcos and their gangs, grew from the 1980s onwards. The 1994 kidnapping<br />
<strong>of</strong> a wealthy businessman yielded a huge ransom; when nearly $30<br />
million in marked bills were discovered in the possession <strong>of</strong> PEMEX<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials, a Deputy Attorney General made arrests and began an investigation,<br />
only to see his brother, PRI secretary-general José Francisco Ruíz<br />
Massieu, murdered a few days later. Other murders included those <strong>of</strong><br />
Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas <strong>of</strong> Guadalajara in 1993, and <strong>of</strong> PRI presidential<br />
candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in 1994. Drug cartels and oldline<br />
(‘‘dinosaur’’) factions <strong>of</strong> PRI were widely regarded as orchestrating<br />
the violence. Lower-level corruption and violence to protect drug shipments,<br />
neutralize law enforcement and military anti-drug activities, and<br />
intimidate or eliminate judges, witnesses, and competing gangs has been<br />
less organized, and in some areas has recently been increasing (Toro,<br />
1998: 138–144; Jordan, 1999: 154–156; Elizondo, 2003).<br />
The fragmented and contentious style <strong>of</strong> more recent corruption is<br />
reflected in a scandal surrounding Andrés Manuel López Obrador,<br />
Mayor <strong>of</strong> Mexico City, and the activities <strong>of</strong> his political ‘‘fixer’’ René<br />
Bejerano. Obrador is a leading PRD figure and a 2006 presidential<br />
front-runner; Bejerano has been Obrador’s campaign manager and<br />
more recently served as majority leader in the city’s legislative body.<br />
Bejerano was caught on a surreptitious videotape accepting large<br />
amounts <strong>of</strong> cash from a contract-seeking businessman whose face was<br />
obscured, but who was later identified as Carlos Ahumada Kurtz.<br />
Bejerano got to witness his own undoing: invited as a guest on the<br />
morning television program El Mañanero – a popular program <strong>of</strong> news,<br />
commentary, and scandal hosted by ‘‘Brozo the Clown’’ (in reality a<br />
comedian named Victor Trujillo) – Bejerano was welcomed with a<br />
screening <strong>of</strong> the video. Obrador’s standing among his party followers<br />
has been little affected. But under the old order few if any non-PRI<br />
politicians would have had enough power to attract money on such a<br />
scale and few television presenters would have dared embarrass a powerful<br />
party figure on live television. The PRI, at one time, might well have<br />
stood by its man – had such damning evidence even come to light – but<br />
the PRD has announced that it will not aid in Bejerano’s defense and did