28.02.2015 Views

CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

150 <strong>Syndromes</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong><br />

in scale, frequency, and disruptive potential (Morris, 1991: 123–127).<br />

Ballooning oil prices, for a time, drove a scramble for wealth (Grayson,<br />

1980), while the subsequent ‘‘oil bust’’ intensified contention over a<br />

shrinking pool <strong>of</strong> revenues. The drug trade fueled violence (Toro,<br />

1998: 138–142) and a more unstructured style <strong>of</strong> corruption. Benefits<br />

that might have been distributed within the PRI to keep the peace, or used<br />

to maintain its popular base, were siphoned out <strong>of</strong> the party. Political<br />

violence and corruption <strong>of</strong> law enforcement, at times connected to los<br />

narcos and their gangs, grew from the 1980s onwards. The 1994 kidnapping<br />

<strong>of</strong> a wealthy businessman yielded a huge ransom; when nearly $30<br />

million in marked bills were discovered in the possession <strong>of</strong> PEMEX<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficials, a Deputy Attorney General made arrests and began an investigation,<br />

only to see his brother, PRI secretary-general José Francisco Ruíz<br />

Massieu, murdered a few days later. Other murders included those <strong>of</strong><br />

Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas <strong>of</strong> Guadalajara in 1993, and <strong>of</strong> PRI presidential<br />

candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in 1994. Drug cartels and oldline<br />

(‘‘dinosaur’’) factions <strong>of</strong> PRI were widely regarded as orchestrating<br />

the violence. Lower-level corruption and violence to protect drug shipments,<br />

neutralize law enforcement and military anti-drug activities, and<br />

intimidate or eliminate judges, witnesses, and competing gangs has been<br />

less organized, and in some areas has recently been increasing (Toro,<br />

1998: 138–144; Jordan, 1999: 154–156; Elizondo, 2003).<br />

The fragmented and contentious style <strong>of</strong> more recent corruption is<br />

reflected in a scandal surrounding Andrés Manuel López Obrador,<br />

Mayor <strong>of</strong> Mexico City, and the activities <strong>of</strong> his political ‘‘fixer’’ René<br />

Bejerano. Obrador is a leading PRD figure and a 2006 presidential<br />

front-runner; Bejerano has been Obrador’s campaign manager and<br />

more recently served as majority leader in the city’s legislative body.<br />

Bejerano was caught on a surreptitious videotape accepting large<br />

amounts <strong>of</strong> cash from a contract-seeking businessman whose face was<br />

obscured, but who was later identified as Carlos Ahumada Kurtz.<br />

Bejerano got to witness his own undoing: invited as a guest on the<br />

morning television program El Mañanero – a popular program <strong>of</strong> news,<br />

commentary, and scandal hosted by ‘‘Brozo the Clown’’ (in reality a<br />

comedian named Victor Trujillo) – Bejerano was welcomed with a<br />

screening <strong>of</strong> the video. Obrador’s standing among his party followers<br />

has been little affected. But under the old order few if any non-PRI<br />

politicians would have had enough power to attract money on such a<br />

scale and few television presenters would have dared embarrass a powerful<br />

party figure on live television. The PRI, at one time, might well have<br />

stood by its man – had such damning evidence even come to light – but<br />

the PRD has announced that it will not aid in Bejerano’s defense and did

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!