CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Oligarchs and Clans 151
not object when his legislative immunity to prosecution was lifted by the
Chamber of Deputies. A tantalizing question is just how the video ‘‘sting’’
came to pass: speculation continues as to which factions or competing
parties’ leaders might have helped lure Bejerano into the trap
(El Universal, December 20, 2004; Guillermopietro, 2004).
Mexican corruption in transition
In 2000 the PRI lost the presidency to opposition candidate Vicente Fox
in a closely monitored, well-organized election. It is tempting to see Fox’s
historic victory as the beginning of a new era in Mexico, but it might also
be the culmination of multiple processes, including both corruption and
reforms, that weakened once-dominant Elite Cartels. Mexico is not yet as
clear a fit in the Oligarchs and Clans category as Russia and the
Philippines, but its corruption has been tending toward that syndrome.
International influences, ranging from pressures to liberalize the economy
to the continuing demand for illegal drugs in the United States,
and continuing institutional weaknesses are long-term causes. But as the
PRI weakened (in 2004 it had to mortgage its headquarters building to
fund campaigns), with it went networks and incentives that had imposed
a kind of order on corruption. The key issue is not where Mexico falls on
international corruption indices but rather the rise of a kind of corruption
more disruptive to development, and more closely linked to violence,
than that of decades past.
In the early 1980s Mexico, in some ways, was a one-party version of
Italy, with an all-encompassing party controlling competition and serving
as a guarantor for corrupt deals, or perhaps a Korean-style system with
less regionalism and fewer powerful generals. But Mexico’s Elite Cartels
faced unique challenges. The PRI won elections for decades, unlike the
short-lived parties of Korea before the late 1990s, and unlike Italian
parties was in a position to win outright. Yet each sexenio was a political
era all its own. Electing powerful presidents who could not succeed themselves
kept the PRI in power but disrupted the continuity of elite networks,
a fact reflected in repeated presidential revelations of their predecessors’
abuses. PRI strength and the state’s weakness reinforced each other, but
contention among PRI elites became increasingly intense. To the extent
that these changes reflect the growing competitiveness of politics and
openness of the economy they suggest that where institutions are weak
and elites are divided, further liberalization may encourage more disruptive
types of corruption (on the risks of political reform see Morris, 1995).
Mexico is now one of the world’s most exciting (and, given its size and
potential, most important) laboratories for reform. The IFE’s successes