CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Participation, institutions, and syndromes of corruption 57
power and that, unlike developing countries today, they had a long time
to institutionalize and adapt those sorts of agreements – a point to which I
will return in discussing reform.
In Group 2 (‘‘Elite Cartels’’) there are more uncertainties and fewer
restraints upon political and economic elites. Political systems and markets
are relatively open and stable (though less so than in Group 1), and
these societies are moderately affluent. But elites face significant competition
in a setting where institutions are more problematic: political rights,
civil liberties, and the rule of law are less secure, government and corruption
controls less effective, regulation somewhat more extensive and of
lower quality, and black markets more pervasive than in Group 1. The
relatively constrained political leaders in this increasingly competitive but
less stable institutional environment might find alliances with business,
media, military, and other elites particularly useful. For some countries in
this group this state of affairs is the result of successful democratic and
market transitions (Chile, Hungary, Poland, South Africa, South Korea),
but others (Argentina, Belgium, Italy) have experienced crises or deterioration
in existing institutions and political settlements. Those countries
might present comparable statistical profiles at a given time, but be
changing in different ways – an issue for the case studies to come.
Group 3 countries (‘‘Oligarchs and Clans’’) present an even more
complex, and in many ways pessimistic, picture. Political and economic
liberalization have come a long way but underlying institutions are
problems. Political competition is extensive but political rights, accountability,
civil liberties, and the rule of law are markedly less secure than in
our first two groups. Both political and economic actors will find it
difficult to protect their positions in such systems, and potential anticorruption
forces are weak. Leaders face fewer political constraints and
regimes are less stable. Government is ineffective, regulation extensive
and of dubious quality, and corruption controls are weak. Economic
opportunities are growing but relatively few seem to benefit (Gini scores
in table B, appendix B, p. 226, suggest high levels of inequality), and
black markets are extensive. Further problems grow out of the disadvantageous
place these countries occupy in the world economy. They are, on
the whole, poor societies in need of international capital, but foreign
domestic investment is weak and there is moderate to heavy reliance
upon primary exports (ores, minerals, food, and the like). Officials must
deal with international economic interests who, facing weak institutions
and unstable regimes, are likely to seek short-term returns rather than
longer-term engagement (Keefer, 1996) and to circumvent taxation and
regulation in any way they can. Local entrepreneurs’ positions are no more
secure, and they too may amass as much wealth as they can, as quickly as