CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

138 Syndromes of Corruption
model. There are several possible reasons: many oligarchs have been in
place in the Philippines for a century or more, producing a kind of
bailiwick system geographically and within state institutions. The economic
stakes in the Philippines – particularly those involving natural
resources – are smaller than those in Russia. Property rights are more
secure in the Philippines: after all, oligarchs dominate the banking system
and, through their political and economic clans, the courts, bureaucracy,
and at times the presidency as well. Many of the benefits sought by
Philippine oligarchs come from without – from the United States, international
aid agencies, or investors – and thus there is value in cultivating
connections (and tolerable reputations) with those external sources
rather than a scrambling for domestic advantages with international
competitors barred.
Still, Oligarchs and Clans corruption has been immensely damaging
in the Philippines. Both the power of the oligarchs and weak, factiondominated
official agencies work against the development of broadbased
democratic movements, a strong and independent civil society,
and (until 1986 at least) credible elections. Democratic alternatives to the
oligarchs have little to offer voters, particularly in remote areas; political
parties tend to be personal followings rather than broad-based groups
rooted in lasting social interests. On the economic side, oligarchic privilege
makes for a fragmented, unpredictable, and in key areas closed economy,
regardless of official policies. International aid has been extensive, but too
often has enriched presidential cronies.
Building family empires
Central authority has long been a shaky proposition in the Philippines.
Spain ruled for three centuries, and yet its local authorities were so short
of resources that they often had to rely on Catholic Church personnel in
remote areas (Hutchcroft, 2000: 3–4). Those friars ruled with impunity
at the day-to-day level, and allegations of abuses on their part were
common (United States, 1901). Largely Islamic Mindanao was even
more of a land unto itself in those years (Warren, 1985). Land was an
obvious base for local power, but Sidel (1997) cautions against reducing
the rise of the oligarchs to landholding alone. At times ownership was the
result of power or force: vote-buying, fraud, and violence helped launch
some provincial oligarchs and protected many more. Indeed, the
American style of colonial rule did more to create the modern oligarchs
than the old Spanish system ever had (Sidel, 1997; Sidel, 2000;
Hutchcroft, 2003), because the US paid more attention to creating
representative institutions than to building an effective central