CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

30 Syndromes of Corruption
Established democracies benefit from strong civil societies, working
consensus on standards of fair play and the limits of political and economic
influence, independent judiciaries and opposition groups, and
from the voters’ ability to throw out the government without toppling
the constitutional regime. Social sanctions – both the force of public
disapproval (Weber, 1958; Elster, 1989) and the various ethics codes
and penalties that can be enforced by professional and business associations
– can also be meaningful restraints. Perhaps the most important
asset in such societies is the very legitimacy that government and the law
accumulate over time through effective performance. But here too corruption
can do political damage – effects that are worrisome both in
themselves and because of their implications for the intangible anticorruption
strengths just noted (Lauth, 2000).
Consider, for example, the vitality of political competition. Doig
(1984) argues that the most serious cases of corruption tend to arise
where political competition is weak (see also Blake and Martin, 2002;
for contrary US evidence, Schlesinger and Meier, 2002). Entrenched
elites can buy off or intimidate opposition parties and voters or construct
backroom coalitions so broad that even when a given faction loses votes it
can retain a share of power. In such settings there may be few political
options and organizational vehicles available to would-be reformers. In
federal systems, opponents can at least appeal to higher levels of government
for support: in many American cities during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, anti-machine groups persuaded state governments
to intervene in local corruption. But decentralization comes at a
price (Fjelsted, 2002; Gerring and Thacker, 2004), for it also leads to a
vast proliferation of access points through which private interests can seek
influence or exercise veto power by means both legitimate and illicit,
and may create political stalemates that encourage bribery to speed
matters along.
Where building political monopolies and extracting corrupt benefits
dominate elite agendas parties may dig in within their own bailiwicks in
both state and society, avoiding competition while cultivating the financial
backing of favored interests. Where they share power in a jurisdiction
they may carve up public budgets and payrolls among themselves (e.g. the
Proporz practices of Germany’s local party organizations outlined in
chapter 4). Such politics may build only limited public trust and commitment;
citizens may see the process as a rich man’s game, and their own
choices at election time as unconnected to the wellbeing of their families
and communities. The ‘‘corruption’’ in such cases – particularly in established
democracies – may come more in terms of damage to democratic
values and processes than actual lawbreaking (Thompson, 1995);