phd.Nana

However, the analysis also shows how collaboration is tightly connected and intertwined with
exactly the economic relations that it is also set contrastively against. On that background it is
argued that the Western insistence of separating morally ”pure relations” from ”free markets”
(Carrier 1995, 1997), is an idea that ”narrows our sight” by excluding aspects of a relation
that do not fit the phantasm of how it ought to be in a given situation.
By the help of taboos and shared silences (Bourdieu 1997), it is to some extent possible to not
see the expectations of reciprocity in relations supposed to be pure (understood as free from
power and strategic negotiation). To some extent it is also possible to not see steering or
unequal distribution of power in relations supposed to be based on collaboration and
equality. But the taboos also imply that some experiences of the relation cannot be expressed
or said out loud. E. g. it is not possible to be against collaboration without being deemed as
unhelpful or unwilling, and it is not possible to ask for payment for collaborating, since it is
not supposed to be regarded as a peace of work, but rather as an investment in the
development of something new and potentially valuable. It is also shown that in keeping
accounts it is not possible to ”see” all forms of value or contributions to the shared project,
this can make the relation ”flip”, and the actors begin experiencing the relation as of another
sort, than initially expected. They start keeping account of the partner’s contributions and to
work in favor of own interests rather that in the interest of the Other or of the shared project.
In chapter 7 phantasms of steerability are examined, and it becomes clear, that different
narratives of how the projects are and ought to be steered dominate the two cases. In one case
different contradictive phantasms are at play. A hierarchical social logic is being legitimized
with reference to a myth of democratically elected politicians and the realization of their
decisions through the parliamentary chain of government – completely in line with what
other scientists have found (Olsen 1978, Torfing 2010). This phantasm collides with the
phantasm of cocreation, which has invoked an expectation of equal collaboration, being
listened to and having influence, from the collaborative partners. Simultaneously, the case is
dominated by two different market-­‐phantasms – The market mechanism, and the motor of
growth -­‐ which stand in the way of each other, implying different sets of subject positions and
legitimizing two completely different types of relations between public and private actors.
These two market phantasms collide with each other in the way that one legitimizes
distanced relations between the public and the private sector, while the other legitimizes
close, trusting relations between the same partners (Vaaben & Lund 2013 forthcoming).
In the other case, the project is seen as being steered through self-­‐governance. This self-­governance
phantasm idealizes dialogue, listening, and openness towards what each person
can bring in into the process. The combination of this phantasm and the phantasm of
cocreation is relatively unproblematic.
In both cases empirical findings can be used to question these phantasms, why it seems fair to
say that these phantasms help reducing the complexity and to not see the contingence and
political character of reality (Glynos and Howarth 2007:145-­‐146).
It is concluded that the phantasm of cocreation is not easily combined with the hierarchical
phantasm of steerability, and that the two market phantasms are not easily combined with
each other. Furthermore, it is argued that in the first case the coexistence of these
contradicting phantasms create a heterophonic situation making it difficult for the actors to
decipher the social rules, to determine what types of relations are allowed, and to find out
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