Department of Energy FY 2012 Congressional ... - The FIRE Place

Justification
The UPF is needed to ensure the long-term viability, safety, and security of the EU capability at Y-12 in
Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The UPF will support the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, down blending of
EU in support of nonproliferation, and provide uranium as feedstock for fuel for naval reactors.
Currently these capabilities reside in aged and “genuinely decrepit” facilities as noted by the Perry
Commission. There is substantial risk that the existing facilities will continue to age to the point of
significant impact to Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Naval Reactors
programs. The impacts could result in loss of the U.S. capability to maintain the nuclear weapons
stockpile through life extension programs, shutdown of the U.S. Navy nuclear powered fleet due to lack
of EU fuel feedstock materials, and impact to the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program’s ability to
reduce the enrichment level of foreign research reactors through supply of lower enrichment fuels
manufactured at Y-12. The risk of inadvertent or accidental shutdown of the existing facilities is high.
Due to the increasing risk a planned shutdown may be necessary prior to completion and startup of a
replacement facility, i.e., the UPF.
When fully functional, the UPF will reduce annual operating costs for Y-12 through the consolidation of
facilities, reduced transfer of materials, reduction in emissions and waste management, reduction in
protective forces required for security, and efficiency gains resulting from the reduction of the Protected
Area footprint.
Scope
The UPF will ultimately consolidate all Category I and II EU operations into a single, modern facility
with state-of-the-art technologies and safeguards and security concepts and strategies. The UPF will
include facilities and equipment required to accomplish the following EU processing operations:
Disassembly and dismantlement of returned weapons subassemblies;
Assembly of subassemblies from refurbished and new components;
Quality evaluation to assess future reliability of weapons systems in the stockpile;
Product certification (dimensional inspection, physical testing, and radiography);
EU metalworking, and
Chemical processing including conversion of scrap and salvage EU to metal, stable, or disposable
forms.
The EU processing operations will be housed in a multi-story, reinforced concrete building. The
primary building will be seismically designed to protect the building and its contents as required by the
applicable safety analysis. A combination of reinforced concrete, concrete masonry units and metal stud
and gypsum board walls will be used for interior partitions. The building provides space for EU
processing systems and will also house supporting and administrative areas.
The existing site Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Alarm System (PIDAS) or similar system will be
extended to enclose UPF within the same Protected Area as the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials
Facility (HEUMF). Additional portals will be included to permit access to the facility. Access and
alarm systems will be provided as required to meet the site security requirements.
Weapons Activities/RTBF/Construction/
06-D-141, Uranium Processing Facility, Y-12 Page 219
FY 2012 Congressional Budget