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The Fourth Lesson: The Vedanta System.1195
seven principles of man.) Ishwara may be worshipped as a Personal God,
and loved as an Over-Soul. But even Ishwara is but an appearance in Maya,
and in the end must awaken to the fact that he is naught in himself, but
Everything in Brahman. And the individual soul, seeing the Truth, may
ignore Ishwara, and piercing his illusory nature may proceed direct to the
bosom of Brahman. Thus does the Vedanta supply the want of each class
of follower—satisfy the hunger of each soul, according to its nature. While
postulating an abstract that, or Absolute, it still allows the intervention of
an Ishwara, or Personal God, with a universal human nature and character,
without being inconsistent or compromising. It willingly admits anything in
Maya, but denies everything in Truth except Brahman Itself—that—in the
words of Max Müller: “Brahman is true, the world is false, the soul is Brahman
and nothing else.” From the beginning to the end, Vedanta is consistent and
logical, facing the consequences of its extreme conclusions without a tremor,
and steadfastly refusing to beat a retreat. A most remarkable manifestation
of human philosophical speculation—without parallel.
And now for this strange and inexplicable Maya—that illusion, imagination,
or dream, that overspreads the being of Brahman and causes him to
“imagine vain things,” and to dream of strange happenings. What of Maya?
We must confess that at this point the Advaitists are brought face to face
with the focused energies of the argument and opposition to their system
and doctrine. It is their “heel of Achilles”—their only vulnerable point, in
the opinion of outside thinkers, although they, themselves, do not admit this,
and claim that the doctrine of Maya is as safely encased in armour as the rest
of their system. From whence arises Maya? There is no outside source, and
it must come from Brahman himself—then why does he permit it? What is
the cause of Maya?
Some of the leading Advaitist teachers refuse to entertain the question in
this shape—asserting that to suppose the necessity of a “cause” or “reason”
for Brahman’s creations would be to assume something to which Brahman
was subject—something ruling, determining or influencing the Infinite—a