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conducting attacks must be applied to those cyber operations. 45 For example, such operationsmust comport with the requirements of distinction and proportionality. 46For example, a cyber attack that would destroy enemy computer systems could not bedirected against ostensibly civilian infrastructure, such as computer systems belonging to stockexchanges, banking systems, and universities, unless those computer systems met the test forbeing a military objective under the circumstances. 47 A cyber operation that would notconstitute an attack, but would nonetheless seize or destroy enemy property, would have to beimperatively demanded by the necessities of war. 4816.5.1.1 Assessing Incidental Injury or Damage During Cyber Operations. Theproportionality rule prohibits attacks in which the expected loss of life or injury to civilians, anddamage to civilian objects incidental to the attack, would be excessive in relation to the concreteand direct military advantage expected to be gained. 49For example, in applying the proportionality rule to cyber operations, it might beimportant to assess the potential effects of a cyber attack on computers that are not militaryobjectives, such as private, civilian computers that hold no military significance, but that may benetworked to computers that are valid military objectives. 50In assessing incidental injury or damage during cyber operations, it may be important toconsider that remote harms and lesser forms of harm, such as mere inconveniences or temporarylosses, need not be considered in applying the proportionality rule. 51 For example, a minor, briefdisruption of internet services to civilians that results incidentally from a cyber attack against amilitary objective generally would not need to be considered in a proportionality analysis. 52 In45 Refer to § 5.5 (Rules on Conducting Assaults, Bombardments, and Other Attacks).46 Refer to § 5.6 (Discrimination in Conducting Attacks); § 5.12 (Proportionality in Conducting Attacks).47 Refer to § 5.7 (Military Objectives).48 Refer to § 5.17.2 (Enemy Property – Military Necessity Standard).49 Refer to § 5.12 (Proportionality in Conducting Attacks).50 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks asPrepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE, 8 (Dec. 2012) (“As you all know, information andcommunications infrastructure is often shared between state militaries and private, civilian communities. The law ofwar requires that civilian infrastructure not be used to seek to immunize military objectives from attack, including inthe cyber realm. But how, exactly, are the jus in bello rules to be implemented in cyberspace? Parties to an armedconflict will need to assess the potential effects of a cyber attack on computers that are not military objectives, suchas private, civilian computers that hold no military significance, but may be networked to computers that are validmilitary objectives. Parties will also need to consider the harm to the civilian uses of such infrastructure inperforming the necessary proportionality review. Any number of factual scenarios could arise, however, which willrequire a careful, fact-intensive legal analysis in each situation.”).51 Refer to § 5.12.2 (Types of Harm – Loss of Life, Injury, and Damage).52 Cf. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, Commentary on the HPCRManual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, 28 (A.1.e.7) (2010) (“The definition of‘attacks’ also covers ‘non-kinetic’ attacks (i.e. attacks that do not involve the physical transfer of energy, such ascertain CNAs [computer network attacks]; see Rule 1(m)) that result in death, injury, damage or destruction ofpersons or objects. Admittedly, whether ‘non-kinetic’ operations rise to the level of an ‘attack’ in the context of the1004