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The military advantage expected to be gained from an attack might not be readilyapparent to the enemy or to outside observers because, for example, the expected militaryadvantage might depend on the commander’s strategy or assessments of classified information.5.7.8 Examples of Objects Often Regarded as Military Objectives. The following typesof objects generally have met the definition of “military objective” in past conflicts, but may notbe military objectives in all circumstances: (1) leadership facilities; (2) communications objects;(3) transportation objects; (4) places of military significance; and (5) economic objectsassociated with military operations or with war-supporting or war-sustaining industries.This list of examples is not exclusive (i.e., an object could fall in more than one categoryin this list), and this list is not exhaustive (i.e., an object outside these categories may nonethelessmeet the definition of military objective). Lastly, this list is not conclusive, i.e., whether anexample is, in fact, a military objective, must be assessed according to the definition of militaryobjective.5.7.8.1 Examples of Military Objectives – Leadership Facilities. Facilities usedby enemy leaders as headquarters for military operations or otherwise to command militaryoperations have often been regarded as military objectives. 175 In some cases, enemy leadersthemselves may be made the object of attack. 1765.7.8.2 Examples of Military Objectives – Communications Objects.Communications objects, such as facilities, networks, and equipment that could be used forof spreading terror and shattering the morale of the population at large—though this was the inevitable concomitantof strategic target-bombing. Thus what remained of the protection afforded by International Law to the civilianpopulation in the matter of aerial bombardment was the principle—generally acknowledged by the Allies, thoughnot always capable of being adhered to in practice—that the bombing of towns or purely residential parts of townswhich were not in any way related to the war efforts of the enemy was unlawful. At the same time abstention fromsuch bombing could also be explained by reference to considerations of economy militating against costlyoperations for the sake of achieving purely psychological effect—considerations the disregard of which rendered theuse by Germany of the flying bomb and long-range projectiles not only unlawful but, in the judgment of many, alsodetrimental to her own war effort.”).174 For example, Judith A. Miller, Commentary, 78 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 107,110 (2002) (“I will readily admit that, aside from directly damaging the military electrical power infrastructure,NATO wanted the civilian population to experience discomfort, so that the population would pressure Milosevic andthe Serbian leadership to accede to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, but the intended effects on the civilianpopulation were secondary to the military advantage gained by attacking the electrical power infrastructure.”). Referto § 5.3.2 (Essentially Negative Duties to Respect Civilians and to Refrain From Directing Military OperationsAgainst Them).175 For example, 2006 AUSTRALIAN MANUAL 2.8, at 2-5 (“HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—AVOIDINGCOLLATERAL DAMAGE, AFGHANISTAN 2002-2003 … A major focus in Afghanistan was the leadership.This meant targeting residences and road convoys, with difficulties of identification and the consequent acceptanceof non-combatant casualties as a necessary proportionate risk to achieve the military objective.”).176 Refer to § 5.8.4 (Leaders).213