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5.12.2.2 Harm Resulting From Enemy Action, or Beyond the Control of EitherParty. Persons or objects harmed through action directly attributable to enemy action, or beyondthe control of either party, would be excluded from the attacking force’s proportionality analysis.For example, civilians injured or killed by enemy air defense measures, such as spentsurface-to-air measures or antiaircraft projectiles, would not be considered in the attackingforce’s proportionality analysis. 309 Similarly, the risk that the attacking force’s munitions wouldbe diverted from their intended target by legitimate deception activities of the opposing force,such as jamming, smoke, or chaff, would not need to be considered in the attacking force’sproportionality analysis.5.12.3 Harm to Certain Categories of Persons and Objects That is Understood Not toProhibit Attacks Under the Proportionality Rule. Harm to the following categories of personsand objects would be understood not to prohibit attacks under the proportionality rule: (1)military objectives; (2) certain categories of individuals who may be employed in or on militaryobjectives; and (3) human shields.5.12.3.1 Harm to Military Objectives. Harm to military objectives, includingenemy combatants, civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, and military equipment, need notbe considered in a proportionality analysis.For example, an attack against an enemy combatant might also injure other enemycombatants who were not the specific targets of the attack. Harm to these individuals or damageto military objectives would not need to be taken into account in applying the proportionalityrule, even if this harm was an unintended result of the attack.5.12.3.2 Harm to Certain Individuals Who May Be Employed In or On MilitaryObjectives. Harm to certain persons who may be employed in or on military objectives would beunderstood not to prohibit attacks under the proportionality rule. These categories include:• persons authorized to accompany the armed forces; 310there are known to be civilians, then the proportionality test may require that account be taken both of the risk to thecivilians from sub-munitions exploding during the attack and of the risk from unexploded sub-munitions in thehours immediately after the attack. It is an entirely different matter, however, to require that account be taken of thelonger-term risk posed by [Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)], particularly of the risk which ERW can pose after aconflict has ended or after civilians have returned to an area from which they had fled. The degree of that risk turnson too many factors which are incapable of assessment at the time of the attack, such as when and whether civilianswill be permitted to return to an area, what steps the party controlling that area will have taken to clear unexplodedordnance, what priority that party gives to the protection of civilians and so forth. The proportionality test has to beapplied on the basis of information reasonably available at the time of the attack. The risks posed by ERW once theimmediate aftermath of an attack has passed are too remote to be capable of assessment at that time.”).309 See, e.g., FINAL REPORT ON THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 177-78 (During the 1991 Gulf War, “[t]here is also aprobability that some [incidental civilian] casualties occurred when unexploded Iraqi SAMs [surface-to-air missiles]or AAA [antiaircraft artillery] fell back to earth. The often dense fire the Iraqis expended in attempts to shoot downCoalition aircraft and cruise missiles almost certainly caused some destruction on the ground from malfunctioningfuses or self-destruction features, as well as the simple impact of spent rounds.”).310 Refer to § 4.15.2.3 (Increased Risk of Incidental Harm).243