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• camouflage or deceptive lighting; 700• removing or altering identifying information, including moving identifying landmarks;• planting false information in a manner that allows enemy forces to intercept it, 701 such asthrough the use ofo false messages among one’s own forces;o intensifying or minimizing message traffic; oro bogus messages, dispatches, or newspapers;• lying in the course of a POW interrogation in answering questions where no obligation toanswer correctly exists;• feigning enemy military status by using enemy flags, insignia, or military uniformsoutside of combat; 702 or• using enemy codes, signals, or passwords. 7035.25.2.1 Mimicking Other Friendly Forces. It is a permissible ruse of war forcombatant forces to mimic other friendly forces. For example, small forces may simulate largerunits. 704 Units of one type may pretend to be units of another type. 705 Markings that identify699 Refer to § 5.25.2.1 (Mimicking Other Friendly Forces).700 For example, SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 154 (“The concealment of cannon in deftly arranged branches orbrushwood is a common device of gunners, but the Japanese reached a dizzy and dramatic height of stratagem whenthey actually transformed the face of nature as a means of masking their batteries. On the night before the battle ofthe Yalu they transplanted trees to hide the tell-tale discharge of their artillery, choosing those growing eitherdirectly in front or directly behind the entrenchment that was to be concealed. Thus next morning the landscapeappeared unchanged from the Russian side of the river, as the fact that a tree of a particular shape had advanced orretired 200 or 300 yards during the night was naturally imperceptible.”) (internal quotations omitted).701 For example, ALBERT N. GARLAND & HOWARD M. SMYTH, SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 64-65 (1993)(“One part of this plan, known as Operation Mincemeat, was designed to convince the enemy high command thatthe objectives of the impending Allied offensive in the Mediterranean were Sardinia and the Peloponnesus ratherthan Sicily. The plan itself was simple but highly imaginative. With painstaking care a counterfeit letter from‘Archie Nye’ of the British War Office in London was drawn up….[i]ndicating that a feint against Sicily would be adeception maneuver to screen an invasion of Sardinia…. To get this letter into Axis hands, British intelligenceobtained with great difficulty the body of a service man who had been a victim of pneumonia.… With a courier’sbriefcase realistically chained to the wrist, the body was cast adrift at a predesignated spot where tide and currentwould carry it to [the Axis-controlled] shore.… The information reached the Germans who accepted it asauthentic.”).702 Refer to § 5.23.1.3 (Deceptive Use of Enemy Flags, Insignia, and Military Uniforms Outside of Combat).703 Refer to § 5.23.1.5 (Use of Enemy Codes, Passwords, and Countersigns Not Restricted).704 For example, HUGH M. COLE, THE LORRAINE CAMPAIGN 162 (1993) (“General Walker asked for a ‘deceptionteam’ to simulate a stronger force in the cavalry sector. This team finally arrived from 12th Army Groupheadquarters and operated for some weeks in the area as an ‘armored division.’ (The Germans seem to have beenwell deceived for the OB WEST maps show the ‘14th Armored Division’ in this area.)”).305