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to refrain from purposeful misconduct may be contrasted with the affirmative obligation thatparties have to take feasible precautions to separate the civilian population, 399 civilianinternees, 400 POWs, 401 fixed medical establishments and medical units, 402 and culturalproperty, 403 from the dangers of military operations.An adversary’s intention to violate this rule is likely to be clear because that adversarynormally would make it apparent to the opposing party that attacks against the military objectivebeing shielded would risk harming protected persons or objects. 404On the other hand, in the absence of purposeful action to put protected persons andobjects at risk of harm from enemy military operations, there would be no violation of this rule.For example, this rule would not prohibit restricting the movement of civilians in order toconduct military operations without their interference. In addition, it would also not prohibit theevacuation of civilians for their own security or for imperative military reasons. 405In addition, this rule must not be understood to alter the rules on spying and sabotage. Inother words, this rule does not prohibit a spy from hiding among civilians in order to gatherintelligence. However, the spy runs the risk of prosecution by the enemy State if he or she isdiscovered and captured while spying.5.16.3 Prohibition on Taking Hostages. The taking of hostages is prohibited. 406 Thisprohibition is understood to include a prohibition against threatening to harm detainees whose399 Refer to § 5.14 (Feasible Precautions to Reduce the Risk of Harm to Protected Persons and Objects by the PartySubject to Attack).400 Refer to § 10.11.1.1 (Avoidance of Particularly Dangerous Areas).401 Refer to § 9.11.3 (Location of POW Camps).402 Refer to § 7.10.2 (Obligation to Situate Military Medical Units and Facilities Relative to Military Objectives).403 Refer to § 5.18.3 (Refraining From Any Use for Purposes That Are Likely to Expose It to Destruction orDamage).404 For example, STUART I. ROCHESTER & FREDERICK KILEY, HONOR BOUND: THE HISTORY OF AMERICANPRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1961-1973 316-21 (1998) (“Between June and October 1967 the NorthVietnamese confined more than 30 U.S. PWs in the vicinity of the Yen Phu thermal power plant in northern Hanoi.… Although the Communists would deny it, their conspicuous display and virtual announcement of the PWs’presence at the power plant evidenced a transparent attempt to use the prisoners as hostages to discourage U.S.bombing of the facility. … Through calculated disclosures to visiting journalists and diplomats, local placardpublicity, and exhibiting the captives in full view of civilians—all sharp departures from their normal practice—theVietnamese could be certain the PWs’ presence would be reported to the U.S. government. … The hostage charadedid not deter U.S. strikes on the target. The plant was attacked regularly after 13 August, with apparently nocasualties and conflicting reports on the extent of damage to the power facility and PW cellblocks.”).405 Cf. BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, NEW RULES 317 (AP I art. 51, 2.8.3) (“Paragraph 7 [of Article 51 of AP I] doesnot prohibit measures to restrict the movement of civilians so as to avoid their interference with military movement,nor does it prohibit ordering their evacuation if their security or imperative military reasons so demand.”).406 GC art. 34 (“The taking of hostages is prohibited.”). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(I) (defining “Taking hostages”as “The act of a person who, having knowingly seized or detained one or more persons, threatens to kill, injure, orcontinue to detain such person or persons with the intent of compelling any nation, person other than the hostage, orgroup of persons to act or refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for the safety or release of suchperson or persons.”); 10 U.S.C. § 950t(7) (“TAKING HOSTAGES.—Any person subject to this chapter who, having260