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egular application of the distinction and proportionality rules, the U.S. view has been that it doesnot reflect customary international law applicable in international and non-international armedconflicts.5.14 FEASIBLE PRECAUTIONS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF HARM TO PROTECTED PERSONS ANDOBJECTS BY THE PARTY SUBJECT TO ATTACKOutside the context of conducting attacks (such as when conducting defense planning orother military operations), parties to a conflict should also take feasible precautions to reduce therisk of harm to protected persons and objects from the effects of enemy attacks. 329 In particular,military commanders and other officials responsible for the safety of the civilian populationsmust take reasonable steps to separate the civilian population from military objectives and toprotect the civilian population from the effects of combat. As discussed above, what precautionsare feasible depends greatly on the context, including operational considerations. 330 Feasibleprecautions by the party subject to attack may include the following:5.14.1 Refraining From Placing Military Objectives in Densely Populated Areas. It maybe appropriate to avoid placing military objectives, such as the armed forces, in urban or otherdensely populated areas, in order to reduce the risk of incidental harm to the civilianpopulation. 331However, it often may not be feasible to refrain from placing military objectives indensely populated areas. Legitimate military reasons often require locating or billeting militaryforces in urban areas or other areas where civilians are present. For example, forces may behoused in populated areas to take advantage of existing facilities, such as facilities for shelter,health and sanitation, communications, or power. In some cases, especially during counterinsurgencyoperations or in non-international armed conflict generally, the protection of the328 See, e.g., United Kingdom, Statement on Ratification of AP I, Jan. 28, 1998, 2020 UNTS 75, 78 (“Re. Articles 56and 85, paragraph 3 (c) The United Kingdom cannot undertake to grant absolute protection to installations whichmay contribute to the opposing Party’s war effort, or to the defenders of such installations, but will take all dueprecautions in military operations at or near the installations referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 56 in the light ofthe known facts, including any special marking which the installation may carry, to avoid severe collateral lossesamong civilian populations; direct attacks on such installations will be launched only on authorization at a high levelof command.”); France, Statement on Ratification of AP I, translated in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, THE LAWS OFARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 801 (2004) (“TheGovernment of the French Republic cannot guarantee an absolute protection to the works and installationscontaining dangerous forces which may contribute to the opposing Party’s war effort, or to the defenders of suchinstallations, but will take all precautions referred to the provisions of Article 56, of Article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii)and of paragraph 3(c) of Article 85 in order to avoid severe collateral losses among the civilian populations,including possible direct attacks.”).329 Consider AP I art. 58 (“The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible: (a) Without prejudiceto Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilianobjects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives; (b) Avoid locating military objectives within ornear densely populated areas; (c) Take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individualcivilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations.”).330 Refer to § 5.3.3.2 (What Precautions Are Feasible).331 Consider AP I art. 58 (“The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible: … (b) Avoid locatingmilitary objectives within or near densely populated areas;”).248