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of that particular case. 153 The legal reasoning underlying the decisions of the International Courtof Justice is not binding on States. 154 Similarly, the decisions of the International CriminalTribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda cannot,as a strictly legal matter, “bind” other courts. 155The legal principle of stare decisis does not generally apply between internationaltribunals, i.e., customary international law does not require that one international tribunal followthe judicial precedent of another tribunal in dealing with questions of international law. 156Moreover, depending on the international tribunal, a tribunal may not be bound by its priordecisions. Some international courts, however, may adhere to their own prior decisions inresolving a case absent a sufficiently persuasive reason to reconsider the point of law. 157153 See, e.g., ICJ STATUTE art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and inrespect of that particular case.”).154 John B. Bellinger, III, Department of State Legal Adviser, 2006 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE ININTERNATIONAL LAW 1024 (“We believe that these concerns were largely borne out in the advisory opinionrendered by the Court. In practice, the opinion has made little meaningful contribution to efforts to resolve issuesbetween the Israelis and Palestinians. Also, the Court’s opinion is open to criticism on its treatment of both factualand legal issues, in some cases due more to process than to any fault on the part of the Court. For example, the factthat the General Assembly had already declared itself on many of the issues, risks creating the impression that theCourt was being used to advance a particular set of political claims. Also of concern are efforts in some quarters tosuggest that aspects of the Court’s advisory opinion, such as that relating to the extraterritorial application of theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, have binding force on member states in contexts that gobeyond those addressed in the advisory opinion. This of course, is not the case. Under the ICJ statute, states arebound only by the decisions—and not by the Court’s reasoning underlying those decisions—in contentious cases towhich they are parties, and advisory opinions have no binding force at all, but rather serve to provide guidance onlegal questions to the UN organ or specialized agency requesting them.”).155 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, Remarks on international criminal justice at the VeraInstitute of Justice in New York and at Leiden University, Campus The Hague, 2012 DIGEST OF UNITED STATESPRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 61, 67 (“The ICTY and ICTR began developing a modern jurisprudence ofcriminal liability that was based on existing law as applied to a modern ethnic conflict. One of the ICTY’s earlyaccomplishments was the Dusko Tadic case, which involved a relatively low-level offender who -- had he beencaught only a few years later -- would have been referred to Bosnia for domestic prosecution. The Tadic decisionprovided a reasoned basis for the seminal conclusions that (1) the UN Security Council had the authority to set up acriminal court under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; (2) the tribunal’s jurisdiction extended to war crimescommitted in the course of a non-international armed conflict; and (3) Tadic could be convicted for his associationwith a small group of offenders, articulating the concept of joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”) that later became acentral feature of the ICTY’s work. … The post-WWII tribunals had largely ignored sexual violence, but the ICTYand ICTR situated the issue within the existing law of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Althoughthese decisions cannot, as a strictly legal matter ‘bind’ other courts, there is no doubt that the jurisprudence of theICTY and ICTR has been influential in the broader development of international criminal law.”).156 I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 36-37 (§103, comment b) (1987)(“That provision [Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ] reflects the traditional view that there is no stare decisis ininternational law.”).157 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, ICTY Appeals Chamber, IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, 107-109 (Mar. 24,2000) (“[I]in the interests of certainty and predictability, the Appeals Chamber should follow its previous decisions,but should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests of justice. … It is necessary to stress thatthe normal rule is that previous decisions are to be followed, and departure from them is the exception. The AppealsChamber will only depart from a previous decision after the most careful consideration has been given to it, both asto the law, including the authorities cited, and the facts.”).35