5cjxburmr

equipment or personnel as belonging to a particular unit may be removed. Individuals or unitsmay also dress like friendly forces. 7065.25.3 Examples of Other Deceptions That Are Not Prohibited. Certain deceptions maynot meet the definition of “ruses” because they may invite the confidence of an adversary withrespect to protection under the law of war. Nevertheless, these deceptions are not technicallyprohibited by the law of war, even though, in some cases, they may expose the personsperforming them to liability under an enemy State’s domestic law. 707 These include:• feigning incapacitation or death in order to escape the enemy, 708 such aso a soldier who feigns death in the hope that he or she will be left alone by enemyforces, permitting him or her subsequently to take evasive actions to return tofriendly forces without engaging the enemy; 709 ando an aircraft crew that feigns loss of control and the appearance that the aircraft wasabout to crash in order to dissuade further enemy attack and to break contact withenemy forces; 710705 For example, R. FRANK FUTRELL, ET AL., ACES AND AERIAL VICTORIES: THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE INSOUTHEAST ASIA 1965-1973, 37-43 (1976) (“The West Force used an elaborate ruse to make the Phantoms appearto the enemy as an F-105 Rolling Thunder strike force. The F4C’s used F-105 tanker anchors, refueling altitudes,approach routes, approach altitudes, airspeeds, and radio call signs and communications to simulate a normalThunderchief strike force. This was intended to deceive the enemy on NVN [North Vietnamese] radars. … Anopportunity to perpetuate another ruse presented itself a few days later, when RF-4C weather reconnaissance aircraftwere forced to abort their planned weather reconnaissance missions in North Vietnam because of MIG attacks on 3and 4 January 1967. To lure the MIG’s into the air, two F4C’s on the following day flew, in close formation, a routesimilar to that normally flown by weather reconnaissance aircraft. The intent of the F4C’s was to deceive the enemyradar operators into believing that only one aircraft was flying a weather reconnaissance mission.”).706 For example, W. Hays Parks, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniform, 4 CHICAGO JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW 493, 554 (2003) (“In response to the September 11, 2001 al Qaeda terrorist attacks against theWorld Trade Center and the Pentagon, US and Coalition Special Forces began operations in Afghanistan in lateSeptember 2001. At the request— initially insistence—of the leaders of the indigenous forces they supported, theydressed in indigenous attire. For identification purposes within the Northern Alliance, this included the Massoudpakol (a round brownish-tan or gray wool cap) and Massoud checkered scarf, each named for former NorthernAlliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was assassinated days before the al Qaeda attacks on the World TradeCenter and Pentagon. This attire was not worn to appear as civilians, or to blend in with the civilian population, butrather to lower the visibility of US forces vis-à-vis the forces they supported.”).707 Refer to § 4.17 (Spies, Saboteurs, and Other Persons Engaging in Similar Acts Behind Enemy Lines).708 ICRC AP COMMENTARY 438 (1505) (“[P]erfidious use always involves the abuse of the adversary’s confidence.Thus, for example, feigning death simply to save one’s life would not be an act of perfidy, while feigning death tokill an enemy once his back is turned, would constitute an act of perfidy.”).709 For example, SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 173 (“A ruse which is mentioned by Major C. J. Biddle,American Aviation, appears to have been a legitimate one. An American pilot was forced down in the Germanlines. ‘When he landed he left his motor turning over slowly and lay over in his cockpit, as though he had been shot,the Huns all the time circling above his head. They evidently thought he was done for, for after looking him overthey flew away, whereupon our pilot took off and came home.”).306