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• In conducting attacks, combatants must assess in good faith the information that isavailable to them. 115• Specific rules apply to the use of certain types of weapons. 116These rules apply to all parties to a non-international armed conflict, including personsbelonging to non-State armed groups, and persons who decide to participate in hostilities of theirown initiative. However, persons who belong to non-State armed groups, or who decide toparticipate in hostilities of their own initiative, may also be subject to the State’s domesticlaw. 11717.7.1 AP II Rule on Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces. AP IIprovides that works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes, andnuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where theseobjects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces andconsequent severe losses among the civilian population. 118 The United States has objected tothis rule in the context of international armed conflict and does not view it as reflectingcustomary international law in either international or non-international armed conflict insofar asthe rule deviates from the regular application of the distinction and proportionality rules. 119However, the Executive, in submitting AP II to the Senate for its advice and consent toratification in 1987, did not recommend a reservation from or an understanding applicable to thisprovision of AP II based on an assessment that preserving the option to attack works orinstallations containing dangerous forces would not be as important in internal conflicts aspreserving that option would be in international armed conflicts. 120114 Refer to § 5.11 (Feasible Precautions in Conducting Attacks to Reduce the Risk of Harm to Protected Persons andObjects).115 Refer to § 5.4 (Assessing Information Under the Law of War).116 Refer to § 17.13.2 (Certain Types of Weapons With Specific Rules on Use in NIAC).117 Refer to § 17.4 (A State’s Use of Its Domestic Law and NIAC).118 Consider AP II art. 15 (“Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclearelectrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives,if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilianpopulation.”).119 Refer to § 5.13.1 (AP I Provisions on Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces).120 Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, Remarks on the United States Position on theRelation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions at theSixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law(Jan. 22, 1987), 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 419, 434 (1987)(“Professor HAMILTON DESAUSSURE asked for an explanation of the apparent inconsistency between the UnitedStates rejection of the provisions in article 56 of Protocol I, relating to dams and dykes, and the simultaneousacceptance of article 15 of Protocol II, which contains similar provisions. Mr. MATHESON replied that the UnitedStates military based its objections on a pragmatic, real-world estimation of the difference between the twosituations. The military perceives that in international conflicts, many situations may arise where it is important toattack and destroy parts of an electric power grid, such as a nuclear or hydroelectric generating station. In internalconflicts, on the other hand, such a significant real-world need will not exist. Preserving the military option in1034