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efficiently as possible. 41 Thus, military necessity may consider the broader imperatives ofwinning the war and not only the demands of the immediate situation. For example, in assessingthe military advantage of attacking an object, one may consider the entire war strategy ratherthan only the potential tactical gains from attacking that object. 42 An interpretation of militarynecessity that only permitted consideration of the immediate situation could prolong the fightingand increase the overall suffering caused by the war. 43Some commentators have argued that military necessity should be interpreted so as topermit only what is actually necessary in the prevailing circumstances, such as by requiringcommanders, if possible, to seek to capture or wound enemy combatants rather than to makethem the object of attack. 44 This interpretation, however, does not reflect customaryinternational law or treaty law applicable to DoD personnel. 45 For example, the law of war doesnot require that enemy combatants be warned before being made the object of attack, nor doesthe law of war require that enemy combatants be given an opportunity to surrender before being41 Refer to § 1.4.1 (Object of War).42 Refer to § 5.7.7.3 (Definite Military Advantage); § 5.12.5 (“Concrete and Direct Military Advantage Expected toBe Gained”).43 See, e.g., Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States, 10 (Jan. 1992) (“Once adecision for military action has been made, half-measures and confused objectives extract a severe price in the formof a protracted conflict which can cause needless waste of human lives and material resources, a divided nation athome, and defeat. Therefore, one of the essential elements of our national military strategy is the ability to rapidlyassemble the forces needed to win -- the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries andthereby terminate conflicts swiftly with a minimum loss of life.”); LIEBER CODE art. 29 (“The more vigorously warsare pursued, the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.”); Count von Moltke, letter to Professor Bluntschli,Dec. 11, 1880, reprinted in G. SHERSTON BAKER, II HALLECK’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 footnote 1 (1908) (“Thegreatest kindness in war is to bring it to a speedy conclusion.”).44 See, e.g., Nils Melzer, Legal Adviser, International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on theNotion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 79 (May 2009) (“Inconjunction, the principles of military necessity and of humanity reduce the sum total of permissible military actionfrom that which IHL does not expressly prohibit to that which is actually necessary for the accomplishment of alegitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.”) (emphasis added); JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT ANDPRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 75-76 (1985) (“If we can put a soldier out of action bycapturing him, we should not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by wounding him, we must not killhim.”).45 See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Chief, International Law Branch, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department ofthe Army, Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, Nov. 2, 1989, III CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED STATESPRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981-1988 3411, 3419 (“In the employment of military forces, the phrase‘capture or kill’ carries the same meaning or connotation in peacetime as it does in wartime. There is no obligationto attempt capture rather than attack of an enemy. In some cases, it may be preferable to utilize ground forces inorder to capture, e.g., a known terrorist. However, where the risk to U.S. forces is deemed too great, if the Presidenthas determined that the individual[s] in question pose such a threat to U.S. citizens or the national security interestsof the United States as to require the use of military force, it would be legally permissible to employ, e.g., anairstrike against that individual or group rather than attempt his, her, or their capture, and would not violate theprohibition on assassination.”).57