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The establishment of such a zone does not relieve the proclaiming belligerent State of itsobligation under the law of war to refrain from attacking vessels and aircraft that do notconstitute military objectives. Thus, a vessel or aircraft that is otherwise protected does notforfeit its protection from being made the object of attack simply by entering a zone of the oceanon the high seas established by a belligerent State. 136In some cases, however, the fact that a vessel or aircraft enters a zone withoutauthorization may be probative in assessing whether it is entitled to protection (e.g., whether it isan enemy military vessel or aircraft, or whether it has acquired the character of enemy militaryvessels or aircraft). 137 For example, the notification of the zone in advance may mean that mostneutral or protected vessels and aircraft have departed the area. Similarly, the entry into the zoneof an unidentified vessel without authorization may be probative of whether the vesselconstitutes a military objective.13.9.3 Use of Zones to Counter Enemy Logistics. Zones may be used to assist in theimplementation of the belligerent’s strategy to counter the adversary’s logistics. 138 For example,zones may be established to facilitate the interdiction of contraband. 139 As a case in point, azone may be established to warn neutral vessels and aircraft that they will be subject to visit andsearch if they attempt to enter the zone without authorization.the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defenceunder Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection, Her Majesty’s Government now wishes to makeclear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries, or militaryaircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British forces in the South Atlantic, willencounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance of theseBritish forces will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.”).136 John H. McNeil, Neutral Rights and Maritime Sanctions: The Effects of Two Gulf Wars, 31 VIRGINIA JOURNALOF INTERNATIONAL LAW 631, 635-36 (1991) (“Iraq replied to these Iranian declarations by proclaiming a series ofescalating exclusion zones, beginning with a ‘prohibited war zone;’ Iraq declared that it would ‘attack all vessels’appearing within these zones, and stated that ‘all tankers, regardless of nationality, docking at Kharg Island aretargets for the Iraqi Air Force.” As noted earlier, Iraq launched the Tanker War in 1984 in an apparent bid tointernationalize the war. During the first months of this new offensive, some seventy ships were hit, many of whichwere neutral-flag tankers bound to or from the massive Iranian oil terminal at Kharg Island. But international lawhas never legitimized attacks upon neutral merchant vessels simply because they ventured into a specified area ofthe high seas.”).137 Refer to § 15.14.2.1 (Acquiring the Character of an Enemy Warship or Military Aircraft).138 For example, L.F.E. Goldie, Maritime War Zones & Exclusion Zones, 64 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGEINTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 156, 185-86 (1991) (“(a) The Exclusion Zone of the Skaggerak The Skaggerak is anarm of the North Sea on its eastern side and lies between Denmark and Norway. It is some 150 nautical miles inlength and 85 miles in width. … The argument vindicating the British proclamation of the Skaggerak as a maritimeexclusion zone under emerging customary international law may be accepted, since the strategy for enforcing theexclusion of the adversary from the zone was an apparently successful one. It was a persisting logistical strategyenforced by both aircraft and submarines providing an adequate ratio of force to space. This proposition can beanalyzed out into the following elements. (i) The zone was reasonable in area, and despite German surface navalpower, the logistical strategy was persistently maintained and was made effective through submarine and aerialwarfare; (ii) The object, while not primarily one of self-defense, was for the related purposes of: … (b) encumberingGermany’s reinforcements and supplies destined for its oppressive occupation of Norway—a victim of Naziaggression; (c) the target shipping had military objectives and purposes and could not be viewed as carrying supplieswhich had the object of benefitting the civilian population of Norway;”).139 Refer to § 15.12 (Neutral Commerce and Carriage of Contraband).884