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equirement to use precision-guided weapons when non-precision-guided weapons may be usedin compliance with the law of war. 134Commanders have a general obligation to take feasible precautions in conducting attacksin order to reduce the risk of harm to the civilian population. 135 The selection of weapons maybe among the available precautions that a commander could take in order to reduce the risk ofharm to the civilian population.14.9.3 Protection of Enemy Ground Forces Who Are Hors de Combat. When aircrew oraircraft operators assess that an enemy combatant has been placed hors de combat, they mustrefrain from making such persons the object of attack. 136In order to place a person hors de combat, the person’s surrender must be (1) genuine; (2)clear and unconditional; and (3) under circumstances where it is feasible for the opposing partyto accept the surrender. 137In many cases, it would not be feasible for a party that is conducting air operations toaccept the surrender of an enemy person. In some cases, however, it may be appropriate, inorder to facilitate such surrender, to communicate steps for enemy units to take to communicateclearly their intention to surrender. 13814.9.3.1 Difficulty in Identifying Persons Placed Hors De Combat. Theidentification by aircraft of an enemy combatant on the ground placed hors de combat may posea particular challenge. It may be difficult for aircrew or aircraft operators to determine whetheran enemy combatant is dead, injured, merely taking cover, or feigning injury or surrender toavoid attack. 139 On the other hand, it may be difficult for enemy combatants on the ground to134 Refer to § 5.11.3 (Selecting Weapons (Weaponeering)).135 Refer to § 5.11 (Feasible Precautions in Conducting Attacks to Reduce the Risk of Harm to Protected Persons andObjects).136 Refer to § 5.10 (Persons Placed Hors de Combat).137 Refer to § 5.10.3 (Persons Who Have Surrendered).138 Captain M. Scott Holcomb, View from the Legal Frontlines, 4 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 561,566-67 (2003) (“In August 2002, I met with Commander Kenneth O’Rourke, the Chief of Operational Law atCENTCOM, and Lieutenant Commander Gregory Bart, the Special Operations Command Central (‘SOCCENT’)Staff Judge Advocate to develop legally supportable concepts that would achieve the commander’s intent to eitherhave Iraqi units assist Coalition forces or indicate a desire not to fight and remain in place, preferably in theirbarracks. … Consequently, we sketched an outline for an operational plan to encourage units to capitulate.Coalition forces would contact Iraqi units through various means including leaflet drops, radio broadcasts, andsurrogates who would inform the commander of his opportunity to surrender with honor and preserve his unit. Iraqiunits would receive these messages shortly before the air campaign started to give them time to perform the requiredactions, but not so much time that they would be subject to regime reprisals. If the unit performed certainobservable actions, such as forming their vehicles in a square, then Special Forces would approach the unit and offerarticles of capitulation for the surrender of the unit.”).139 See SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 132 (“In the second world war also there were one or two instancesin which ground forces showed the white flag to aircraft. … Other circumstances are conceivable in which therecould be no assurance that the display of a white flag was not a ruse to enable the enemy troops to escape after theimmediate danger was past. In such circumstances it could he [sic] held that the airmen were under no obligation todiscontinue their attack.”).921