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• facilitating surprise attacks or ambushes, 688 such as byo misleading the enemy as to the planned targets or locations of militaryoperations; 689o baiting the enemy into a trap; oro distracting or disorienting the enemy;• inducing enemy forces to waste their resources;• inducing enemy forces to surrender by falsely alleging military superiority;• provoking friendly fire among enemy forces; or• causing confusion among enemy forces.5.25.1.2 But That Do Not Infringe Upon Any Rule of International LawApplicable in Armed Conflict. According to the definition in AP I, ruses do not infringe uponany rule of international law applicable in armed conflict. For example, misusing certain signsand symbols would not constitute ruses. 690 Similarly, although fighting in the enemy’s uniformwould not be perfidy since enemy military personnel are not generally protected by the law ofwar, fighting in the enemy’s uniform also would not be a ruse, since such action would infringeupon the rule against improper use of the enemy’s uniform. 6915.25.1.3 And That Are Not Perfidious Because They Do Not Invite the Confidenceof an Adversary With Respect to Protection Under That Law. The ruses described in AP I do notinvite the confidence of the enemy with respect to protection under the law of war. 692 For688 Refer to § 5.5.6.1 (Surprise Attacks).689 For example, FINAL REPORT ON THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 247 (“CINCCENT [Commander-in-Chief, U.S. CentralCommand] placed a high priority on deception operations which were intended to convince Iraq that the main attackwould be directly into Kuwait, supported by an amphibious assault. All components contributed to the deceptionoperation. Aggressive ground force patrolling, artillery raids, amphibious feints and ship movements, and airoperations all were part of CINCCENT’s orchestrated deception operation.”); SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WARRIGHTS 185 (“‘The greatest hoax in military history’ was the description officially applied to the scheme ofdeception used to induce the Germans to believe that the invasion of the Continent in June, 1944, was coming in thePas de Calais and not in Normandy. It was carried out by a force of 105 aircraft of the R.A.F., by 34 ships of theRoyal Navy, and by ‘R.C.M.’ (Radio Counter-Measures). On the night of 5 June, 18 small ships of the Navysteamed towards Cap d’Antifer to give the impression of an intended landing, while a bomber squadron, No. 617,under G/Capt. G. L. Chesire, V.C., circled over them, dropping bundles of ‘Window,’ the thin metallised stripswhich produce false echoes on the enemy’s radar screens and so confuse their plotting. Another squadron, No. 218,with 16 ships, made a similar feint towards Boulogne, and other methods of deception were practised elsewherealong the Channel. The result was that the enemy were led to believe that convoys were moving to points other thanthat at which the landing was in fact made with complete success and without opposition by air or sea.”).690 Refer to § 5.24 (Improper Use of Certain Signs).691 Refer to § 5.23.1 (Improper Use of Enemy Flags, Insignia, and Military Uniforms Prohibited).692 Refer to § 5.22.1 (Definition of Perfidy).303